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Regulating Identity: Medical Regulation as Social
Control
Matt Lamkin*
New biomedical technologies offer growing opportunities not only to
prevent and treat illnesses, but also to change how healthy people think,
feel, behave, and appear to others. Controversies over these
nontherapeutic practices are a pervasive feature of contemporary
American culture, from students on “study drugs” and cops on steroids
to skin-lightening by black celebrities and the over-prescription of
antidepressants. Yet the diversity of these controversies often masks their
common root—namely, disputes about the propriety of using medical
technologies as tools for shaping one’s identity.
Some observers believe these so-called “enhancement” practices
threaten important values, offering unfair advantages to users and
undermining their ability to lead “authentic” lives. But existing systems
of medical regulation, which were designed to promote the safety of
therapeutic treatments and to deter drug abuse, are largely blind to
concerns beyond protecting human health. As identity-modifying
practices continue to proliferate, calls are growing to restrict access to
these technologies on moral grounds.
These proposals overlook the United States’ extensive and
unfortunate experiences regulating nontherapeutic medical practices to
enforce contested conceptions of morality. From Prohibition and the war
on drugs to laws restricting contraceptives and abortion procedures,
these efforts have been costly, ineffective, and intrusive. They have also
interfered with fundamental liberties involving bodily integrity and
identity—a fact that is widely recognized in the context of reproduction
technologies, but largely overlooked with respect to other medical
interventions. Rather than expanding our reliance on contested moral
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concerns in policing access to medical interventions, the U.S. should
purge its existing regulation of morality-based intrusions and recommit
itself to protecting human health.
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INTRODUCTION
New biomedical technologies offer growing opportunities not
only to prevent and treat illnesses, but also to modify identities.
Cosmetic procedures can change one’s physical appearance,
including altering one’s sex and perceptions of one’s race or age.
Healthy students and professionals seek to enhance their intelligence
using drugs designed to treat attention deficit disorders, while others
use antidepressants not to treat depression, but to alter their
personalities—to become more confident and outgoing, less anxious
and brooding.
Some observers believe these identity-modifying practices
threaten important values. Disparities in access to drugs that improve
cognition could exacerbate economic inequalities. Using cosmetic
procedures to lighten one’s skin or to produce more “Westernlooking” eyes can reinforce beauty standards that are infused with
bigotry. Responding to feelings of sadness or anger by taking
antidepressants may reduce individuals’ motivation to address the life
challenges and social injustices that sometimes underlie
these emotions.
These concerns are qualitatively different from the key aim that
ostensibly animates the United States’ existing systems of medical
regulation: protecting human health. The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act seeks to protect health by ensuring that the therapeutic
benefits of drugs and medical devices outweigh these products’ risks.
The Controlled Substances Act likewise purports to restrict access to
drugs based on assessments of their health risks and therapeutic
benefits. State-level regulation of medical practice, including
physician licensing and malpractice statutes, aims to deter doctors
from acting in ways that threaten patient health.
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Because these existing regulatory systems are not designed to
respond to the moral concerns raised by identity-modifying
interventions—often referred to as “enhancements” 1—some
observers have called for expanding the scope of medical regulation
to address such concerns. While these proposals vary in their
particulars, they share a common core: empowering regulators not
merely to protect health, but to “adjudicate among competing
ethical claims” 2 and restrict access to biomedical interventions based
on “judgments about the technology’s social and ethical
implications.” 3 As Francis Fukuyama has argued: “What should we
do in response to biotechnology that in the future will mix great
potential benefits with threats that are either physical and overt or
spiritual and subtle? The answer is obvious: We should use the power
of the state to regulate it.” 4
This article argues it is far from obvious that we should use state
power to address the “spiritual and subtle” threats posed by
biotechnology. Indeed, the United States’ considerable experience in
restricting biomedical interventions on moral grounds provides
ample reason to be skeptical of such proposals. From alcohol and
drug prohibition to laws restricting contraceptives and abortion
procedures, when regulation has strayed from protecting health to
enforcing morals these efforts have been costly, ineffective, and
intrusive. The United States would be better served by reducing,
rather than expanding, its reliance on contested moral considerations
in limiting access to biomedical interventions.
Part I describes how aspects of human identities are increasingly
susceptible to modification by biomedical interventions, and outlines
the concerns these practices raise among bioethicists and other
observers. Part II describes how the United States’ existing systems
of medical regulation, which ostensibly focus on protecting human

1. CARL ELLIOTT, BETTER THAN WELL: AMERICAN MEDICINE MEETS THE
AMERICAN DREAM xvii–xviii (2003) (defining “enhancement technologies” as “drugs and
procedures that are employed by doctors not just to control illness, but also to improve human
capacities or characteristics.”).
2. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA & FRANCO FURGER, BEYOND BIOETHICS: A PROPOSAL FOR
MODERNIZING THE REGULATION OF HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGIES 17 (2007).
3. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 214 (2002).
4. Id. at 10.
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health, are generally blind to the broader moral concerns expressed
by critics of enhancements. This part also describes several proposals
to empower regulators to restrict identity-modifying practices on the
basis of concerns other than protecting individuals from
physical harm.
Part III offers three arguments against regulating medical
interventions to enforce contested moral views. First, the abject
failure of the United States’ efforts to prohibit the use of alcohol and
other mind-altering drugs cautions against expanding this strategy to
restrict identity-modifying practices. Despite the Controlled
Substances Act’s purported emphasis on preserving health, in its
implementation the federal government has used the Act as an
instrument of social control—to enforce prevailing morality and
combat social deviance. Like Prohibition before it, the “war on
drugs” has been both costly and ineffective, offering a poor model
for reforming the regulation of biomedical interventions.
Second, these reform proposals rest on a distinction between
“therapies” and “enhancements” that is too malleable to accomplish
reform advocates’ goals. Proponents of expanding the scope of
medical regulation call for distinguishing between interventions that
treat illnesses, which would continue to be regulated on the basis of
safety, and enhancements, which would be subjected to broader
scrutiny and tighter restrictions. But it is remarkably easy to
characterize any biomedical intervention that alleviates some form of
human suffering as a treatment for a legitimate illness. Policies that
singled out identity-modifying interventions for special restrictions
would merely increase incentives to characterize these practices as
treatments for illnesses.
Finally, some medical interventions can implicate bodily integrity
and identity in profound ways. Restricting these practices is
tantamount to regulating who people are allowed to become—
including how we think, feel, behave, and are perceived by others. As
the history of restrictions on reproductive technologies illustrates,
government should not interfere with deeply personal decisions
regarding one’s own body and mind in order to enforce contested
views of morality.
In concluding, I argue that rather than expanding our reliance
on moral concerns in regulating medical technologies, the United
States would be better served by purging its existing medical
regulation of morality-based intrusions, whether latent or overt, and
505
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recommitting itself to regulating medicine for the purpose of
protecting human health.
I. IDENTITY-MODIFYING INTERVENTIONS AND THEIR
DISCONTENTS
A. Our Identities Are Increasingly Susceptible to Modification by
Biological Interventions
The United States’ systems of medical regulation have long
distinguished between two types of uses of biological interventions:
therapeutic practices aimed at treating or preventing disease and
disability, and the “recreational” use of psychotropic drugs. But
there is another set of practices that does not rest comfortably in
either of these categories: the use of biomedical interventions to
enhance or otherwise modify certain features of healthy bodies
and brains.
Although some of these practices date back to prehistoric times,
new technologies have expanded the range of potential modifications
and growing medical consumerism has spurred demand for them.
Today people can use biomedical interventions to shape an everexpanding range of physiological and psychological traits, changing
how we appear to others and how we feel, behave, and think. These
practices have become so ubiquitous that it is easy to overlook this
increasingly prominent feature of American culture: the use of
medical interventions as tools for forging our identities. 5
These practices take many different forms and raise concerns that
differ in both degree and type. Grouping them together is not
intended to deny these differences, but to highlight what these
seemingly disparate practices share in common: all of them can have
profound (even if not necessarily equally profound) implications for
individuals’ sense of identity. It is often precisely that potential that
worries critics and motivates proposals to regulate these practices on
moral grounds.

5. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 52–53 (“Enhancement technologies have become part of
‘the governance of the soul’ . . . the management of meaning through the management of
the self.”).
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1. Beauty
In 2012, Americans spent some $11 billion to receive more than
fourteen million cosmetic procedures—nearly triple the number of
reconstructive procedures performed in the same period. 6 While
cosmetic interventions are often dismissed as vain trivialities,
enhancing one’s attractiveness can yield tangible benefits. People
who are perceived as attractive tend to get better grades in school,
earn higher incomes, and receive shorter prison sentences than their
less attractive peers. 7
But the demand for cosmetic procedures is not merely, or even
primarily, driven by the pursuit of positional advantages. The growth
of cosmetic surgery also illustrates “the tightening relationship
between the body and self-identity.” 8 As philosopher Carl Elliott
writes, cosmetic interventions can play an important role in gaining
social affirmation of one’s chosen identity, by altering one’s outward
appearance to match his internal sense of self. Drawing on Charles
Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity, Elliott argues that “identity can
never be wholly inwardly generated. It must be developed in
dialogue with others.” 9 Modifying one’s appearance can be a way of
ensuring that one’s chosen identity will be affirmed when standing in
front of the “social mirror.” 10
For example, Kathy Davis’ Reshaping the Female Body describes a
woman who explained her decision to have a breast reduction by
pointing to a disjuncture between the way she thought of herself and
the way others perceived her. 11 “Big breasts are supposed to be sexy,”

6. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC SURGEONS, 2012 PLASTIC SURGERY STATISTICS
REPORT 5–6 (2012).
7. Timothy Judge et al., Does It Pay to Be Smart, Attractive, or Confident (or All
Three)? Relationships Among General Mental Ability, Physical Attractiveness, Core SelfEvaluations, and Income, 94 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 742, 744–55 (2009); Andrea DeSantis &
Wesley Kayson, Defendants’ Characteristics of Attractiveness, Race, and Sex and Sentencing
Decisions, PSYCHOL. REP. 81, 679–83 (1997); Irene Frieze et al., Attractiveness and Income for
Men and Women in Management, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1039, 1039–57 (1991); John
Salvia et al., Attractiveness and School Achievement, 15 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 60 (1977).
8. CHRIS SHILLING, THE BODY AND SOCIAL THEORY 9 (1993).
9. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 41 (citing CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF
AUTHENTICITY 47–48 (1991)).
10. Id. at 42.
11. KATHY DAVIS, RESHAPING THE FEMALE BODY: THE DILEMMA OF COSMETIC
SURGERY 77–78 (1995).
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she explained. “So you get to be a sex bomb whether you want to be
or not.” 12 Her breast reduction allowed her to conform her outward
appearance to her internal sense of her identity as “the small-breasted
type.” 13 Similarly, in his memoir Muscle, Sam Fussell describes
becoming drawn to steroids as a means of ensuring that others
would recognize his chosen identity as a bodybuilder. 14 As Fussell
explains, “If who you are is what you do, and as a bodybuilder, what
you do is what you look like, then . . . I was distinctly in trouble,
because I didn’t look like a bodybuilder.” 15 While Fussell participated
in bodybuilding competitions, by his own telling “I was concerned
far less with competition than with self-identity. As long as the part I
played was simply interior, I felt like a fraud.” 16
2. Race and ethnicity
Although racial categories are social, not biological facts, people
can and do use biological interventions to change how others
perceive their race. Like other features of identity, race is constructed
through dialogue between individuals and the broader society. 17 This
dialogue creates spaces within which individuals can engage in what
Snow and Anderson have called “identity work,” deploying various
strategies to construct racial identities and to have them recognized
by others. 18 These strategies can include selectively associating with
people of the individual’s chosen race, highlighting or downplaying
certain cultural symbols, and selectively disclosing information about
one’s racial heritage. 19 However, because perceptions of race are
tightly connected to physical appearance, “if one’s phenotype differs
significantly from socially constructed notions of what members of a
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.
SAMUEL WILSON FUSSELL, MUSCLE: CONFESSIONS OF AN UNLIKELY
BODYBUILDER (2015)).
15. Id. at 122.
16. Id at 123.
17. Nikki Khanna & Cathryn Johnson, Passing as Black: Racial Identity Work Among
Biracial Americans, 73 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 380, 383 (2010) (“[R]ace and identity arise out of
a social process in which meanings are created and modified through social interaction
with others.”).
18. David A. Snow & Leon Anderson, Identity Work Among the Homeless: The Verbal
Construction and Avowal of Personal Identities, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1336 (1987).
19. Khanna & Johnson, supra note 17, at 381.
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particular race are expected to look like, they have considerable
difficulty asserting that racial identity no matter what identity
strategy they employ.” 20 Accordingly, one of the most important
ways individuals manage their racial identities is by changing how
they look.
Racial and ethnic minorities have long used biological
interventions to obscure their heritage and assimilate into American
culture. 21 In the early twentieth century, scores of Jews—and other
immigrants who feared being mistaken for Jews—sought out surgery
to hide “the so-called Jewish nose, a term that had found its way
into popular currency by the 1920s.” 22 After World War II, many
Asian Americans began pursuing eyelid surgery to “westernize” their
eyes. 23 And for many years some African Americans have used
cosmetics and creams to lighten their skin—sometimes incurring
serious health risks in the process. 24
More recently, it has become increasingly common for people to
use cosmetic interventions not to assimilate into white culture, but
to accentuate their identities as racial minorities. 25 Research by
Khanna and Johnson suggests many biracial individuals are
“modifying their phenotypes to pass as black or to accent their black
ancestry”—by, for example, using skin tanning. 26 Similarly, plastic
surgeons are witnessing a shift among the preferences of immigrants
to the United States. “Rather than striving to fit in to their new
country, many immigrants reshape themselves to their home

20. Id. at 389.
21. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 164.
22. Id. at 190. In 1936, the founder of the American Board of Plastic Surgery argued
“[c]hange in the shape of the pronounced Jewish nose may be sought for either social or
business reasons.” Id. at 191.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Catherine Saint Louis, Creams Offering Lighter Skin May Bring Risks, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at A1 (describing the story of Allison Ross, who used skin lightening
creams “to be more accepted in society.” The cream made her “fairer,” but also made her skin
“so thin that a touch would bruise her face. Her capillaries became visible, and she developed
stubborn acne.”).
25. Khanna & Johnson, supra note 17, at 386 (“identity work is not just about
concealing or covering a stigmatized identity, but highlighting a non-stigmatized or preferred
identity, or what we term accenting.”).
26. Id. at 387.
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culture’s trends and tastes.” 27 The president of the Long Island
Plastic Surgical Group refers to plastic surgeons as “amateur
sociologists,” claiming that he can guess which procedures patients
will request based on their ethnic background and age. 28
3. Sex
“A person’s sexual anatomy, and hence that person’s sense of
sexual self, is core to an individual’s self-definition.” 29 Although most
people identify with their biological sex—or the sex “assigned” to
them at birth by virtue of their physiological attributes—some
people experience a profound discordance between their biological
sex and their sense of their own sexual and gender identities. 30 In her
memoir, Conundrum, Jan Morris reports that when she was a young
boy she felt that she had been “born into the wrong body, and
should really be a girl.” 31 Morris describes feeling “deprived of an
identity” as a man. 32 But after undergoing sex reassignment surgery,
she felt able “to live as myself, to clothe myself in a more proper
body, and achieve Identity at last.” 33
Like many others before and after her, Morris used medical
interventions to conform her physical attributes to her internal sense
of identity as a woman. Female-to-male transsexuals can use surgical
procedures to have their breasts removed and genitals reshaped, and
can take testosterone to increase their musculature, to grow facial
and body hair, and to deepen their voices. 34 Male-to-female
transsexuals may obtain breast implants, surgery to reshape their
genitals, and/or estrogen to help produce a more typically female

27. Sam Dolnick, Ethnic Differences Emerge in Plastic Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2011, at A17.
28. Id.
29. Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence: What
Lawrence Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115,
124 (2006).
30. Id.
31. JAN MORRIS, CONUNDRUM 3 (1974).
32. Id. at 40.
33. Id. at 104.
34. Female to Male Transsexuals: Gender Reassignment and FTM Surgery, Transitioning
Guide, FEMALETOMALE.ORG, www.femaletomale.org/ftm-transitioning-guide/ (last visited
Nov. 5, 2015).
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body shape. 35 Some trans-females also use surgical procedures—such
as crico-thyroid approximation and laser-assisted voice adjustment—
to raise the pitch of their voices by shortening or thinning their
vocal cords. 36
4. Intelligence
Many people take drugs to improve their cognitive performance.
The drugs most commonly used for these purposes include
stimulants like Ritalin and Adderall, which are marketed as
treatments for attention deficit disorders, and Provigil, which is
approved as a treatment for sleep disorders. 37 “Several other
compounds with different pharmacological actions are in early
clinical trials, having shown positive effects on memory in healthy
research subjects.” 38
Although these drugs are marketed as treatments for illnesses,
they are increasingly used to enhance cognition among healthy
individuals. 39 According to one survey, “almost 7% of students in US
universities have used prescription stimulants in this way, and . . . on
some campuses, up to 25% of students had used them in the past
year.” 40 These students are not alone. Media accounts are filled with
stories of academics, military personnel, professional poker players,

35. The Philadelphia Center for Transgender Surgery, MALE-TO-FEMALE,
www.thetransgendercenter.com/index.php/maletofemale1.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
36. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 22.
37. Hank Greely et al., Towards Responsible Use of Cognitive-enhancing Drugs by the
Healthy, 456 NATURE 702, 702 (2008).
38. Id.; see also Peter J. Whitehouse et al., Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually
Intact, 27 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14, 22 (1997) (“Our ability to treat dementia and other
brain-based disorders is improving, and these developments will likely lead to pharmaceutical
tools to increase cognition in humans who are not suffering from a clinical condition causing
cognitive impairment.”).
39. Barbara Sahakian & Sharon Morein-Zamir, Professor’s Little Helper, 450 NATURE
1157, 1157 (2007) (“off-label and non-prescription use by the general public is becoming
increasingly commonplace”); M. Elizabeth Smith & Martha J. Farah, Are Prescription
Stimulants “Smart Pills”? The Epidemiology and Cognitive Neuroscience of Prescription
Stimulant Use by Normal Healthy Individuals, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 717 (2011) (summarizing
research on the prevalence of nonmedical use of prescription stimulants).
40. Greely et al., supra note 37, at 702.
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and Wall Street bankers using drugs to boost intelligence
and performance. 41
But while there is ongoing research into new drugs that could
enhance intelligence, 42 there is little evidence that this is what
existing drugs actually accomplish. 43 Rather, research suggests that
users are not taking these drugs to enhance their brains’ processing
power or memory, but to change aspects of their personalities in
ways that are conducive to performing intellectual tasks—reducing
daydreaming, enhancing self-control, and increasing one’s interest in
intellectual work. 44
In a 2012 study, Dr. Ilina Singh conducted a series of interviews
with children taking ADHD drugs to determine “the implications of
stimulant drug use for key dimensions of children’s moral identity.”45
While most of the children did not feel that the drugs made them
different people, many parents reported sentiments like “[h]e’s like a
different person on medication” or “I feel like I hardly recognize her
now that she has started taking the medication.” 46 The children’s

41. Brendan Maher, Poll Results – Look Who’s Doping, 452 NATURE 674, 674 (2008)
(reporting that one in five readers of Nature—generally academic researchers—who responded
to the journal’s informal poll reported using stimulants for nonmedical purposes, in particular,
to enhance their focus and concentration); Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, supra note 39, at 1158
(“Cognitive-enhancing drugs are increasingly being used in non-medical situations such as
shift work and by active military personnel.”); Karen Kaplan & Denise Gellene, They’re Bulking
TIMES,
Dec.
20,
2007,
up
Mentally,
L.A.
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/20/science/sci-braindoping20 (professional poker
player Paul Phillips “credited the attention deficit drug Adderall and the narcolepsy pill
Provigil with helping him earn more than $2.3 million as a poker player.”); Robert Kolker, The
Real Limitless Drug Isn’t Just for Lifehackers Anymore, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 31, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/modafinil-2013-4/; Alexis Madrigal, 20 Percent of
Scientists Admit Using Brain-Enhancing Drugs — Do You?, WIRED (Apr. 9, 2008),
www.wired.com/2008/04/20-of-scientist/.
42. Greely et al., supra note 37.
43. See, e.g., Smith & Farah, supra note 39 (cataloging and summarizing clinical studies
on whether stimulants improve performance on tests designed to assess various aspects of
cognition; the results were mixed, with evidence generally pointing to modest
enhancing effects).
44. Scott Vrecko, Just How Cognitive Is “Cognitive Enhancement”? On the Significance
of Emotions in University Students’ Experiences with Study Drugs, 4 AM. J. BIOETHICS
NEUROSCIENCE 4 (2013).
45. ILINA SINGH, VOICES: VOICES ON IDENTITY, CHILDHOOD, ETHICS AND
STIMULANTS 4 (2012), www.adhdvoices.com/documents/12_0819_Voices_Report_LR72dpi-GREY_V4.pdf.
46. Id. at 24.
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own descriptions of these drugs’ effects emphasized their emotional
and behavioral changes. Many reported that stimulants reduced the
amount of time they spent daydreaming, which helped them
improve their organization and increased their opportunities and
desire for socializing. 47
In another recent study, many healthy college students who take
stimulants to improve academic performance asserted that the drugs
did not make them smarter. 48 Rather, study participants emphasized
the way these drugs changed their personalities, including their levels
of motivation and interest in engaging in intellectual work. 49 Many
students reported feeling more motivated to do work when taking
stimulants, with some describing feeling “driven” to work and others
reporting feeling more “stressed” about the importance of finishing
projects. 50 Students also expressed feeling more interested in their
academic work when under the influence of stimulants. Some
reported that their work became “less tedious,” “something that was
sort of fun” or even “exciting.” 51
As they became more engaged in their academic work, many
students became less interested in other endeavors, such as
socializing or web surfing. 52 Another study found that stimulants
increased participants’ willingness to delay gratification, finding that
when subjects were given amphetamines they were more willing to
wait for a larger monetary reward rather than settling for a smaller
amount immediately. 53
In sum, the widespread use of so-called “smart pills” appears to
extend well beyond merely enhancing intelligence. Rather, “these
enhancements may well be changes critical to a person’s identity, a

47. Id. at 24, 37.
48. Vrecko, supra note 44, at 10.
49. Id.; see also Joshua Foer, The Adderall Me: My Romance with ADHD Meds, SLATE
(May
10,
2005),
www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2005/05/the_adderall_me.ht
ml (“I didn’t feel like I was becoming smarter or even like I was thinking more clearly. I just
felt more directed, less distracted by rogue thoughts, less day-dreamy.”).
50. Vrecko, supra note 44, at 7–8.
51. Id. at 9.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Maia Szalavitz, Popping Smart Pills: The Case for Cognitive Enhancement, TIME,
(Jan. 6, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1869435,00.html.
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person’s sense of who he or she is.” 54 Users report significant
changes to their self-control and impulsivity, their tendency to
daydream, and even their interest in activities like socializing and
engaging in intellectual work.
5. Personality
Antidepressants like Prozac and Paxil are among the most
prescribed drugs in the United States. 55 From 1988 to 2008,
antidepressant prescriptions rose by nearly 400 percent. 56 According
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 12
percent of Americans aged twelve years and over—and more than 22
percent
of
women
aged
forty
to
fifty-nine—take
57
antidepressant medications.
Most of these people are not clinically depressed. The CDC
estimates that about eight percent of all Americans over age twelve
took antidepressant medication, despite having “no current
depressive symptoms.” 58 No doubt many of these people use
antidepressants to treat anxiety disorders and other ailments. But in
Listening to Prozac, psychiatrist Peter Kramer offered another reason
for the enormous popularity of the drug: “its ability to
alter personality.” 59
Kramer describes his numerous experiences prescribing
antidepressants to people who did not meet the diagnostic criteria
for depression, but who simply liked themselves better—indeed, felt
more “like themselves”—on these drugs. For a significant minority
of Kramer’s patients, “Prozac seemed to give social confidence to the
habitually timid, to make the sensitive brash, to lend the introvert

54. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 257.
55. See, e.g., Brendan L. Smith, Inappropriate Prescribing, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC. 36,
37 (2012) (antidepressants are the second most commonly prescribed drug in the United
States, just after cholesterol-lowering drugs); CDC: Antidepressants Most Prescribed Drugs in
U.S., CNN.COM (July 9, 2007), www.cnn.com/2007/HEALTH/07/09/antidepressants/.
56. Laura A. Pratt et al., Antidepressant Use in Persons Aged 12 and Over: United States,
2005–2008, NCHS Data Brief (Oct. 2011), www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db76.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. PETER D. KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC: THE LANDMARK BOOK ABOUT
ANTIDEPRESSANTS AND THE REMAKING OF THE SELF 10 (rev. ed. 1997).
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the social skills of a salesman.” 60 About a patient called “Tess,”
Kramer reports:
Here was a patient whose usual method of functioning changed
dramatically. She became socially capable, no longer a wallflower
but a social butterfly. Where once she had focused on obligations
to others, now she was vivacious and fun-loving. Before, she had
pined after men; now she dated them, enjoyed them, weighed their
faults and virtues. 61

Kramer viewed this use of antidepressants as a kind of analog to
cosmetic
surgery,
coining
the
phrase
“cosmetic
psychopharmacology” to capture the use of chemicals “to modify
personality in useful, attractive ways.” 62
Others have turned to different drugs to alter their personalities.
By his own account, actor Cary Grant was “horrendous”—an “utter
fake, a self-opinionated bore, a know-all who knew very little.” 63 But
then Grant reported that “I have been through a psychiatric
experience which has completely changed me,” a process he
described as being “born again.” 64 Grant had not found religion, but
LSD, a drug he claimed to have ingested more than sixty times.
Grant reported that his experiences on the drug had transformed
him, stripping him of the “defenses, hypocrisies and vanities” that
previously had plagued him. 65
Burgeoning clinical research into the effects of psychedelic
substances corroborates anecdotal accounts like Grant’s. Researchers
at Johns Hopkins recently reported the results of two doubleblinded, placebo-controlled studies in which healthy participants
with no history of using hallucinogenic drugs were given psilocybin,
a psychedelic compound similar to LSD. 66 Notwithstanding a large
body of evidence showing that core personality traits change very
60. Id. at 18–19.
61. Id. at 10–11.
62. Id. at 15.
63. JAY STEVENS, STORMING HEAVEN: LSD AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 64–
65 (1980).
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id.
66. Katherine A. MacLean et al., Mystical Experiences Occasioned by the Hallucinogen
Psilocybin Lead to Increases in the Personality Domain of Openness, 25 J.
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1453 (2011).
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little across the lifespan, the authors found that a single dose of
psilocybin produced “fundamental changes in personal concerns,
goals, and identity”—changes that endured more than a year after
ingesting the drug. 67 The authors found that these changes “were
larger in magnitude than changes in personality typically observed in
healthy adults over decades of life experience”—larger than increases
produced by successful treatment with antidepressants, and
comparable to another study involving “hundreds of hours of
solitary meditation over the course of 3 months.” 68
6. Spirituality
The Hopkins studies not only suggested lasting personality
changes, they proposed a psychological mechanism for these
changes: mystical experiences. Not only did study participants who
ingested psilocybin have mystical experiences, sixty-seven percent
rated their experience as “either the single most meaningful
experience of his or her life or among the top five most meaningful
experiences of his or her life,” comparable to “the birth of a first
child or death of a parent.” 69 Moreover, participants’ judgments
about the meaningfulness of these experiences had not diminished
when they were assessed more than a year after their session. 70
While research into the effects of various drugs on spirituality is
blossoming, the phenomenon is ancient. Psilocybin itself “has been
used as a sacrament for centuries, possibly millennia, in structured
religious ceremonies.” 71 Indigenous inhabitants of the Americas have
long used psychedelic compounds found in plants, such as peyote
and ayahuasca, to induce spiritual transformations—practices that
continue to this day. 72 Although these substances are banned under

67. Id.
68. Id. at 1457.
69. R. R. Griffiths et al., Psilocybin Can Occasion Mystical-Type Experiences Having
Substantial and Sustained Personal Meaning and Spiritual Significance, 187
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 268, 276–77 (2006).
70. R. R. Griffiths et al., Mystical-Type Experiences Occasioned by Psilocybin Mediate the
Attribution of Personal Meaning and Spiritual Significance 14 months later, 22 J.
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 621, 631 (2008).
71. Id. at 621.
72. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418 (2006).
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the Controlled Substances Act, the U.S. government has carved out
exceptions for their use by certain indigenous groups, in recognition
of the importance of these drugs to their religious practices. 73
The use of biological interventions to induce spiritual
experiences or express spirituality includes surgical interventions as
well. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, surgical removal of the
foreskin is the foundation of God’s covenant with Abraham. 74 In
medieval times, devout penitents in Europe satisfied their desire to
transcend the flesh by devising horrific tortures that left their bodies
grotesquely deformed. 75 Several native North American tribes
practiced forms of ritual “hookswinging,” in which participants were
suspended in the air by hooks skewered through the flesh of their
backs. In the Mandan’s O-Kee-Pa ceremony, this practice was
undertaken as a ritual of rebirth and initiation into manhood.76
Among the Blackfoot, the flesh that tore from the skin through this
ritual was offered as a sacrifice to the Sun. 77
7. Memory
When Shakespeare’s Macbeth begs his royal physician to soothe
his wife’s conscience by “plucking” out her troubling memories, the
physician responds, “[t]herein the patient [m]ust minister to
himself.” 78 But new research suggests future doctors may be able to
do better. Neuroscientists are making surprising gains in their ability
to dampen, erase, and even create specific memories. 79

73. Id. at 420.
74. Genesis 17:9–14 (King James) (“Then God said to Abraham . . . ‘you shall be
circumcised . . . and it shall be a token of the covenant betwixt me and you.’”).
75. SHILLING, supra note 8, at 191.
76. W. C. MacLeod, The Nature, Origin, and Linkages of the Rite of Hookswinging:
With Special Reference to North America, ANTHROPOS INSTITUT, Jan.–Apr. 1934 at 1, 1–38.
77. Id. at 5.
78. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 3.
“Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas’d,
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And with some sweet oblivious antidote
Cleanse the stuff’d bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart?” Id.
79. Raül Andero et al., Amygdala-Dependent Fear Is Regulated by Oprl1 in Mice and
Humans with PTSD, 5 SCI. TRANSL. MED. 1 (2013); Adam Piore, Totaling Recall, 22 SCI.
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Much of this research is directed at treating or preventing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by dampening traumatic memories.
Some studies suggest that administering drugs like Propranolol to a
victim shortly after a traumatic event can interfere with the
consolidation of memories of the event, reducing the likelihood of
developing PTSD. 80 More interesting, and potentially troubling, is
research suggesting the potential to erase specific memories at any
time. “Memory reconsolidation” theory hypothesizes that the act of
recalling a memory temporarily places it in an unstable state, during
which time it may be possible to modify or erase the memory. 81 At
least one set of researchers tested this hypothesis on humans, using
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) to temporarily impair distressing
memories. 82 Researchers first showed subjects two disturbing slide
shows depicting traumatic stories—a physical assault and a car
accident. 83 Later, they prompted subjects to recall one of the two
stories and then administered ECT while the subjects’ memories of
that story were “reactivated.” When the subjects were tested the
next day, they performed no better than chance in trying to recall
the details of the “reactivated” story. 84 Their memories of the other
story were unaffected. 85

AM. MIND 40 (2012); Roger K. Pitman et al., Pilot Study of Secondary Prevention of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with Propranolol, 51 SOC. BIOL. PSYCHOL. 189 (2002); Benedict
Carey, Brain Researchers Open Door to Editing Memory, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2009),
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/06/health/research/06brain.html; Meredith Cohn, Method to
Erase Traumatic Memories May Be on the Horizon, BALT. SUN, Nov. 22, 2010,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-11-22/health/bs-hs-erasing-memories20101122_1_fearful-memory-proteins-researchers; Katie Drummond, No Fear: Memory
Adjustment Pills Get Pentagon Push, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2011, 2:00 PM),
www.wired.com/2011/12/fear-erasing-drugs/; Alison Winter, Should We Erase Painful
(Dec.
31,
2011),
Memories?,
SALON
www.salon.com/2011/12/31/should_we_erase_painful_memories/.
80. Andero et al., supra note 79; Pitman et al., supra note 79.
81. Piore, supra note 79.
82. Marijn C W Kroes et al., An Electroconvulsive Therapy Procedure Impairs
Reconsolidation of Episodic Memories in Humans, 17 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 204 (2014);
Piore, supra note 79; Jonah Lehrer, The Forgetting Pill Erases Painful Memories Forever,
WIRED (Feb. 17, 2012), www.wired.com/magazine/2012/02/ff_forgettingpill/all/1.
83. Helen Shen, Zapping the Brain Can Help to Spot-clean Nasty Memories, NATURE
(Dec. 22, 2013), www.nature.com/news/zapping-the-brain-can-help-to-spot-clean-nastymemories-1.14431.
84.
85.
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Perhaps most intriguing, other research has demonstrated the
ability to implant false memories in mice using optogenetics, a
method that uses light to activate specific brain cells. 86 Researchers
placed mice in a chamber and shocked them, conditioning the mice
to associate that chamber with the shock. Later, when they placed
the mice in a different chamber, the mice did not freeze in fear—
until researchers used light to activate the memory cells connected to
the first chamber. Then the mice did freeze, appearing to incorrectly
recall that the second, harmless chamber was where they had
been shocked.
The ability to erase or modify memory would have profound
implications for identity. As Adam Kolber observes:
Memory and identity are closely linked. We feel a special
connection to our past selves largely because were remember
having our past experiences . . . While memory is not the sole
constituent of personal identity, it creates much of the
psychological continuity that makes us aware of our continuing
existence over time. 87

While memory-modifying interventions might gain regulatory
approval as treatments for PTSD, once approved they could also be
used to ease guilty consciences or eliminate memories of other
painful or embarrassing events. 88
B.

Key Concerns About Identity-modifying Interventions

As we develop powerful new technologies for modifying bodies
and minds, discomfort with these practices is growing—in the
popular press and among policymakers, doctors, and ethicists.
Medical ethics and legal literature is teeming with books and articles
raising ethical concerns about enhancement practices. 89 In its most
86. Liu et al., Optogenetic Stimulation of a Hippocampal Engram Activates Fear
Memory Recall, 484 NATURE 381 (2012); Ramirez et al., Creating a False Memory in the
Hippocampus, 341 SCI. 387 (2013); Elizabeth Landau, Scientists give mice false memories,
CNN (July 25, 2013), www.cnn.com/2013/07/25/health/mouse-brain-memory.
87. Adam Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Memory
Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1601 (2006) (internal citation omitted).
88. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 207 (2003) [hereinafter BEYOND THERAPY].
89. See, e.g., id.; NICK BOSTROM & JULIAN SAVULESCU, HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 1–22
(2008); LEON KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR
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recent Ten-Year Forecast, the Institute for the Future, a Palo Alto
think tank, focused on the “enormous potential for chaos” from
unbridled human enhancement and emphasized the need “to make
explicit the rights and restrictions that would apply to the rapidlygrowing set of cognitive enhancement technologies.” 90 News stories
and popular books about these practices and their hazards—the
exploding use of ADHD drugs by healthy students, the over-use of
antidepressants, skin lightening by celebrities like Michael Jackson
and Sammy Sosa, the prospect of memory erasure—have
become ubiquitous. 91
A 2007 report by the British Medical Association warned that
[m]any techniques that involve attempts to modify or improve
aspects of ourselves or others are seen as ethically problematic . . .
[P]articular concerns arise from interference with the brain
precisely because it is intrinsically linked with our personality and
individuality and because the long-term effects of interfering with
this very complex system are unknown. 92

Britain’s Academy of Medical Sciences, the British Academy, the
Royal Academy of Engineering, and the Royal Society have

BIOETHICS (2008); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE
AGE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING (2007); Henry T. Greely, Remarks on Human Enhancement,
56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139 (2007–2008); I. Glenn Cohen, What (If Anything) Is Wrong with
Human Enhancement? What (If Anything) Is Right with It?, 49 TULSA L. REV. 645 (2014).
90. Jamais Cascio, Magna Cortica, OPEN THE FUTURE (May 13, 2014, 12:33 PM),
www.openthefuture.com/2014/05/magna_cortica.html.
91. KATHERINE SHARPE, COMING OF AGE ON ZOLOFT: HOW ANTIDEPRESSANTS
CHEERED US UP, LET US DOWN, AND CHANGED WHO WE ARE (2012) (describing the
author’s experiences taking antidepressants and her concerns about their effects on her identity
and relationships); Carey, supra note 79; Enrique Rojas, Sammy Sosa: Facial Cream Caused
Lightening
of
Skin,
ESPN
(Nov.
10,
2009),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4642952; Alan Schwarz, Risky Rise of the
Good Grade Pill, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2012,
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/education/seeking-academic-edge-teenagers-abusestimulants.html; Thomas Watkins, Michael Jackson Had Dozens Of Skin-Whitening Creams,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2010), www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/26/michaeljackson-had-dozen_n_515528.html.
92. BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, BOOSTING YOUR BRAINPOWER: ETHICAL
ASPECTS OF COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENTS 3 (2007), http://enhancingresponsibility.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Boosting_brainpower_tcm41-147266.pdf.
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expressed similar concerns. 93 On this side of the Atlantic, President
George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics warned of this trend in a
lengthy report entitled Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit
of Happiness. The Council argued that although “[a]lcohol,
marijuana, cocaine, and other consciousness-affecting drugs offer
temporary pleasures and escapes, and they can surely alter behavior
and sense of self,” newer biotechnologies are more troubling because
of “their capacity for more precise, long-term, and sought-after
alterations in the human psyche.” 94 President Obama’s Commission
for the Study of Bioethical Issues recently studied the “pressing
ethical issues concerning equitable access to enhancements and their
benefits, appropriate management of risks, and obligations and
freedoms to enhance or not.” 95
Critics of enhancement argue these practices raise a host of
concerns, most of which do not apply to therapeutic uses of medical
technology. Many of these concerns relate to parents subjecting their
children to medical interventions for purposes other than treating
illnesses—to make them smarter or stronger or taller. Others relate
to interventions forced upon unwilling adults, such as involuntary
behavior modification for prisoners. These situations raise difficult
issues—particularly surrounding consent—that are unique to those
contexts, and that others have ably explored elsewhere. 96 This article
instead focuses on the use of identity-modifying technologies by
consenting adults. Within that context, critics have raised three
primary concerns beyond the current system’s focus on protecting

93.

THE ACADEMY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES ET AL., HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE
[hereinafter HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK] (2012),
https://www.acmedsci.ac.uk/viewFile/publicationDownloads/135228646747.pdf.
94. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 208–09.
95. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, GRAY
MATTERS: INTEGRATIVE APPROACHES FOR NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 8 (May
2014), www.bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Gray%20Matters%20Vol%201.pdf.
96. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994) (examining, e.g., whether limitations should be
placed on genetic enhancement of offspring); Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal
Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103 (2008) (discussing legal
and ethical considerations raised by “treating” criminality with medical interventions); Jack M.
Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 844
(2007); Andrew B. Coan, Is There a Constitutional Right to Select the Genes of One’s Offspring?,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (2011); Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. Rev.
1373 (1995).
FUTURE OF WORK
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users’ health: fairness, agency, and authenticity. 97 While there is
considerable debate over the validity of these concerns, the purpose
of the remainder of this section is to describe these concerns, rather
than to critically analyze them. The argument offered in this paper is
that even if one accepts that enhancements raise important ethical
concerns, restricting access to these interventions on contested moral
grounds is bad policy.
1. Fairness and coercion
Some worry about the use of identity-modifying interventions as
tools to obtain positional advantages. This concern is most obvious
in the context of sports, where athletes have long used steroids,
human growth hormone, EPO, beta blockers, stimulants, and a host
of other drugs to improve their performance. Sports associations at
every level have sought to ban athletes from using performance
enhancing drugs, in large part because they are perceived to give
users unfair advantages. 98 Even outside the realm of athletics, life is
full of competitions in which biology can confer competitive
advantages. Given the many benefits of being perceived as attractive,
using cosmetic surgery to enhance appearance can boost one’s
prospects in countless endeavors. 99 Some argue that healthy students
who use stimulants as study aids may gain unfair advantages in
pursuing academic achievement—advantages that may help them get
into better colleges or secure better jobs. 100
These advantages will likely be unevenly distributed according to
wealth. 101 “Enhancement technologies . . . are expensive and are

97. Critics have raised a host of other concerns as well, including objecting to the
perceived “unnaturalness” of these interventions, their potential to erode social solidarity, and
their tendency to undermine our sense of “openness to the unbidden.” KASS, supra note 89;
Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law in FDA
Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1146–58 (2005); Sandel, supra note 89.
98. World Anti-Doping Agency, Code Signatories, www.wada-ama.org/en/World-AntiDoping-Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-Organizations/The-Code/Code-Acceptance/
(last visited Nov. 8, 2015) (listing the sport organizations that have adopted WADA’s antidoping code). WADA’s motto is “play true.”
99. See sources cited supra note 7.
100. Schwarz, supra note 91.
101. Eric Racine & Judy Illes, Neuroethical Responsibilities, 33 CAN. J. NEUROLOGICAL.
SCI. 269, 271 (2006) (“enhancement could jeopardize distributive justice and cloud the
meaning of medical intervention in modern societies”); see also Nick Bostrom & Anders
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likely to remain so.” 102 The health insurance that most Americans
rely on to pay for medical interventions covers treatments for many
illnesses, but does not pay for interventions that are not considered
medically necessary. 103 For example, insurers generally will pay for
stimulants to treat attention deficit disorders, but they will not cover
these drugs simply because a student feels she studies more
effectively when taking them. If a cognitive enhancement were
highly effective but unevenly distributed according to wealth,
wealthy individuals could compound their advantages while the
disadvantaged fell further behind. 104
This concern about fairness gives rise to a related concern about
coercion, or pressure to use biological interventions to compete for
grades, jobs, and romantic partners. In some cases that pressure may
be overt. For example, soldiers in the United States’ military can be
legally required to take stimulants to promote alertness and enhance
their performance. 105 One can imagine other circumstances in which
employers—or even workplace safety regulations—might require
healthy employees to use medical interventions to improve
performance or promote safety. In 2008, Hank Greely and coauthors suggested that if there were very safe drugs that improved
surgeons’ performance, it might be appropriate to require doctors to
take these drugs when performing risky operations. 106
Even in the absence of explicit requirements to enhance,
employers or schools could implement performance requirements
that are difficult to meet without medical interventions. 107 Many

Sandberg, Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges, 15 SCI. &
ENGINEERING ETHICS 311, 331 (2009) (“[A]ccess to enhancers is often dependent on being
able to find an open-minded physician who will prescribe the drug. This creates inequities in
access. People with high social capital and good information get access while others
are excluded.”).
102. HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra note 93, at 44.
103. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 150 (2007).
104. HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra note 93, at 44.
105. Greely et al., supra note 37, at 703.
106. Id.
107. HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra note 93, at 45 (“For
example, expectations on lorry drivers could in future be based on the number of hours for
which their awareness levels are sufficient with the use of a cognitive enhancer. Or individuals
in labour-intensive jobs, perhaps baggage handlers or construction workers, could be required
to do work that would be much more easily performed with enhanced strength.”).
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people already feel pressure to use biological interventions just to
remain competitive. Professional athletes appear reluctant to “play
naked”—i.e., without performance enhancing drugs—out of fear
that it will put them and/or their teams at a disadvantage against
players who are doping. 108 When the U.S. Senate considered
imposing a tax on cosmetic procedures, the National Organization
for Women argued this would be unfair to middle-aged women who
need Botox and “eye work” to be competitive in the job market. 109
And the trend of using stimulants as study aids has spread from
college campuses to high schools, where students report that “some
students who would rather not take the drugs would be compelled
to [do so] because of the competition over class rank and colleges’
interest.” 110 One student who admitted to selling Adderall to his
fellow high school students indicated that “insecurity was a main
part of his sales pitch,” persuading students that if they did not use
the drug they “would feel at a huge disadvantage.” 111
2. Agency
Other concerns deal with how identity-modifying practices can
change how we perceive ourselves and construct meaning in our
lives—worries sometimes characterized as involving “agency” and
“authenticity.” Agency concerns come in several flavors, but their
common thread is the idea that using biological interventions to
change how we feel, think, and behave will reinforce the idea that
our identities are biologically determined. 112
In Listening to Prozac, Peter Kramer tells the story of Sam, an
architect who sought Kramer’s treatment for depression. Sam had
“cultivated a continental, nonconformist manner” and prided himself
108. Childs Walker, Baseball’s Fast-lane Drug, BALT. SUN, June 25, 2006,
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2006-06-25/sports/0606250153_1_amphetamines-traberillegal-substance/ (quoting former Major League Baseball player Ken Caminiti, “[Y]ou hear it
all the time from teammates, ‘You’re not going to play naked, are you?’”); Lance Armstrong
Used PEDs to Win and “Ruthlessly” Required Teammates to Do Same, USADA says, CBS NEWS
(Oct. 10, 2012), www.cbsnews.com/news/lance-armstrong-used-peds-to-win-and-ruthlesslyrequired-teammates-to-do-same-usada-says/.
109. Jesse McKinley, A Tax on Nips and Tucks Angers Patients, Surgeons, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2009, at A14.
110. Schwarz, supra note 91.
111. Id.
112. KRAMER, supra note 59, at 18.
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on his independent style. 113 While taking Prozac “Sam became less
bristling, had fewer rough edges,” and he experienced that change as
a loss. “The style he had nurtured and defended for years now
seemed not a part of him but an illness. What he had touted as his
independence of spirit was a biological tic. . . . [T]he medication
redefined what was essential and what was contingent about his own
personality.” 114 As Kramer repeatedly observed this effect of Prozac
on some patients’ self-concept, he came to believe that new drugs
would foster a cultural consensus that our identities are simply
products of physiological processes: “When one pill at breakfast
makes you a new person, or makes your patient, or relative, or
neighbor a new person, it is difficult to resist the suggestion, the
visceral
certainty,
that
who
people
are
is
largely
115
biologically determined.”
Some worry this materialist consensus will undermine “our
notions of responsibility, of free will, of unique and socially
determinative individual development.” 116 President Bush’s Council
on Bioethics argued that using biological interventions to shape who
we are and how we behave can alter “the relationship between the
doer and the deed, or between the human agent and the human
activities he or she engages in.” 117 As a result we may cease to view
ourselves as moral agents who are “responsible—worthy of praise or
blame—for the things we do and for the way we are.” 118 For
example, when athletes like Lance Armstrong and Alex Rodriguez
are labeled “frauds” and “cheaters,” the condemnation seems to
have less to do with their rule-breaking than with the idea that they
falsely claimed for themselves credit that in fact belonged to their
drugs. 119 As Michael Sandel argued, “[A]s the role of the
enhancement increases, our admiration for the achievement fades.

113. Id. at ix.
114. Id. at x.
115. Id. at 18.
116. Id.
117. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 143.
118. SANDEL, supra note 89, at 25.
119. Thom Loverro, Alex Rodriguez and Lance Armstrong Are Not Heroes – They Are
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
13,
2013),
Cheaters,
THE
www.theguardian.com/sport/2013/aug/13/alex-rodriguez-lance-armstrong-cheaters.
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Or rather, our admiration for the achievement shifts from the player
to his pharmacist.” 120
Modifying ourselves with biological interventions may reduce
our sense of responsibility not only for our achievements, but for our
shortcomings as well, replacing ideas like character with notions of
biological inputs and outputs. 121 The President’s Council on
Bioethics illustrated this point by contrasting dealing with “restless
and unruly” children through moral instruction or biological
intervention. 122 The Council argued that “[p]raise and blame from
parents and teachers, patient instruction and extra attention, as well
as the experience of performing poorly or well, can help strengthen
the will of the child, which slowly increases the child’s ability to
control his or her impulses and behavior.” 123 By contrast, addressing
problematic
behavior
using
behavior-modifying
drugs
“circumvent[s] that process, and act[s] directly on the brain to affect
the child’s behavior without the intervening learning process.” 124
Rather than learning self-control, these children may instead come to
the conclusion that they are “governed largely by chemical impulses
and not by moral decisions grounded in some sense of what is right
and appropriate.” 125
3. Authenticity
Other critics of enhancement worry that by modifying ourselves,
we are not being true to who we really are. As with the agency
critique, this concern is not merely about individuals who may be
living “inauthentic” lives, but about the effects of these practices on
the broader society. Many people appear to use these technologies to
relieve discomfort that arises from a broad range of social difficulties.

120. SANDEL, supra note 89, at 25; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 8 (arguing that
nontherapeutic technologies “blur the line between what we achieve on our own and what we
achieve because of the levels of various chemicals in our brains.”); BEYOND THERAPY, supra
note 88, at 144.
121. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 92 (“regarding ourselves and our activities in
largely genetic or neurochemical terms may diminish our sense of ourselves as moral actors
faced with genuine choices and options in life.”).
122. Id. at 91.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 92.

526

03.LAMKIN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

501

8/11/2016 3:21 PM

Regulating Identity

To the extent individuals respond to social challenges by modifying
themselves, this can reduce the impetus to address the
underlying problems.
a. Acceding to social injustices. Society’s appearance standards are
often infused with forms of prejudice, including a strong preference
for lighter skin. An individual’s skin tone can have serious financial
implications. Lighter skin tone is associated with higher educational
attainment for black men and women, and “strikingly” higher
employment rates for black women. 126 Immigrants to the United
States with the darkest skin color earn an average of seventeen
percent less than immigrants with the lightest skin color, even after
controlling for their occupations in their source countries, education
levels, English language proficiency, and other factors. 127 Racist
appearance standards can also take an emotional toll. Recent research
by Margaret Beale Spencer found that when children were presented
with white and black dolls and asked questions about them, both
black and white children were more likely to attribute positive
attributes to the white doll and negative attributes to the darker
colored doll. 128
While we can credit much of America’s progress on racial issues
to individuals who have resisted bigotry, others have adapted to
racial prejudice by obscuring their racial heritage—including a long
history of using skin-lightening cosmetics among African
Americans. 129 In the United States, skin-lightening is highly
controversial. Singer Michael Jackson’s ever-lighter skin prompted
endless speculation that he used skin-lightening interventions—
rumors Jackson felt compelled to deny. 130 In 2009, baseball star
Sammy Sosa caused a stir when he appeared in public with starkly

126. Joni Hersch, Skin-Tone Effects among African Americans: Perceptions and Reality,
96 AM. ECON. REV. 251, 254 (2006).
127. Joni Hersch, Profiling the New Immigrant Worker: The Effects of Skin Color and
Height, 26 J. LAB. ECON. 345, 346 (2008).
128. Jill Billante & Chuck Hadad, Study: White and Black Children Biased Toward
(May
14,
2010,
4:24
PM),
Lighter
Skin,
CNN.COM
www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/13/doll.study/. Spencer’s study recreated the landmark “Doll
Study” conducted in the 1940s by Kenneth and Mamie Clark. Id.
129. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 190–93.
130. Madison Park, In Life of Mysteries, Jackson’s Changed Color Baffled Public,
CNN.COM (July 8, 2009), www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/07/06/skin.color.vitiligo/.
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lighter skin. Sosa, too, denied he had intentionally lightened his skin,
but later admitted using a cream to achieve this result. 131
By contrast, in India, skin-lightening is a multimillion dollar
industry, fueled by advertising that brazenly touts the social
disadvantages of having dark skin. 132 In one ad, a man says to his
“fairer-skinned” friend, “I am unlucky because of my face.” The
friend replies, “Not because of your face, because of the color of
your face.” After using a product called “Fair & Handsome,” the
darker-skinned actor is miraculously whitened, and he rides off on a
motorcycle with an attractive woman. 133 Other marketing directed at
women touts skin lightening as a form of feminist empowerment,
arguing lighter skin will help these women secure better jobs and
become independent. 134
Judging from the booming market for skin-lighteners, many
Indians perceive lighter skin to be beneficial. But when individuals
accede to their society’s preference for lighter skin rather than
resisting it, they may improve their own prospects at the expense of
reinforcing racist standards. 135 Philosopher Margaret Little refers to
these practices as forms of “cultural complicity.” 136 The more skinlighteners, nose surgeries, and double-eyelid procedures are
performed, the more entrenched these preferences become. 137

131. Rojas, supra note 91.
132. Shantanu Guha Ray, India’s Unbearable Lightness of Being, BBC NEWS (Mar. 23,
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8546183.stm (research agency AC Nielsen estimates
that in 2010 the Indian whitening cream market was worth $432 million and growing at a rate
of 25 percent per year).
(Mar.
23,
2008),
133. Cosmopolitan
Films,
Fair
Menz,
YOUTUBE
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dOeRVxWgW1g; Sara Sidner, Skin Whitener Advertisements
(Sept.
9,
2009),
Labeled
Racist,
CNN.COM
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/09/09/india.skin/.
134. Fair
&
Lovely,
Changing
Her
Destiny,
https://web.archive.org/web/20121016014701/http://fairandlovely.in/our_history/our_h
istory_details.aspx?histid=historyDetails04 (“When [the Indian woman’s] dreams seem
impossible to achieve or she felt dejected, Fair & Lovely stepped in and gave her the
confidence to achieve her dreams.”); Fujifilm84, Fair and Lovely Skin Cream Ad (in English),
YOUTUBE (Apr. 9, 2007), www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIUQ5hbRHXk (“The obstacle to
having my dream job was my skin.”).
135. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, 189–90.
136. Id. at 190.
137. Id.
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The potential for complicity is not limited to cosmetic
interventions. For example, the typical elementary school
experience—including expectations to sit quietly and stay focused for
extended periods of time—is ill-suited to many children, especially
young boys. Giving cognition-enhancing drugs to children who
struggle in conventional classrooms may reduce the drive to improve
the learning environment for these students. One pediatrician who
admits to prescribing stimulants to children who struggle in school,
regardless of whether they suffer from ADHD, argues “I don’t have
a whole lot of choice. . . . We’ve decided as a society that it’s too
expensive to modify the kid’s environment. So we have to modify
the kid.” 138 Medicating children to get them to sit in their seats for
longer stretches, or to focus in an overcrowded classroom, may make
even longer stretches or more crowded classrooms seem viable.
Children who might have been able to function well in the previous
environment may need medications to help them cope with the new
one, creating a spiral of increasing pressure to medicate.
b. Distorting emotional responses. Concerns about responding to
social problems by manipulating one’s personality and emotions are
not new. In 1957, a Time Magazine story headlined Happiness By
Prescription expressed alarm over the widespread use of tranquilizers
to “treat” the common stresses and disappointments of everyday
.139
life In terms that now seem quaint, one pharmacologist wondered
whether these practices might “make millions of people significantly
indifferent to politics—or to their responsibilities as automobile
140
drivers?” By 1971, Richard Nixon was grousing that “[w]e have
produced an environment in which people come naturally to expect
that they can take a pill for every problem—that they can find
satisfaction and health and happiness in a handful of tablets or a few
141
grains of powder.”

138. Alan Schwarz, Attention Disorder or Not, Pills to Help in School, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2012, at A1.
139. Happiness by Prescription, TIME, Mar. 11, 1957, at 61.
140. Id.
141. Richard Nixon, Remarks to the American Medical Association’s House of Delegates
Meeting
in
Atlantic
City,
New
Jersey
(June
22,
1971),
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3051.
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These early rumblings took on new urgency in the 1990s with
the blockbuster success of a new class of antidepressants called
SSRIs. Unlike the minor tranquilizers that preceded them, drugs like
Prozac did not merely relieve anxiety, but in some cases profoundly
altered personalities. 142 These drugs seemed to help many people
whose discomfort often seemed less like manifestations of illness than
understandable frustrations and anxieties in the face of challenging,
though not necessarily unusual, circumstances. 143
While some people may feel happier while taking antidepressants,
some observers worry that using medications to tweak emotions may
leave us “estrange[d] . . . emotionally from life as it really is,”
preventing ourselves from “responding to events and experiences,
whether good or bad, in a fitting way.” 144 Part of the concern about
creating a disconnect between people’s emotions and the world
around them relates to how this might affect individuals in their
pursuit of the good life. 145 If we are trapped in unrewarding jobs or
harmful relationships, the emotional distress caused by these
circumstances can motivate us to change, to seek something better
or more meaningful. If we instead use medication to blunt our
emotional distress, we may be less likely to pursue these changes.
Describing her experiences on antidepressants, author Katherine
Sharpe writes:
Looking back, it seems remarkable that I had to work so hard to
absorb an elementary lesson: Some things make me feel happy,
other things make me feel sad. But for a long time antidepressants
were giving me the opposite lesson. If I was suffering because of a
glitch in my brain, it didn’t make much difference what I did. For
me, antidepressants had promoted a kind of emotional illiteracy.
They had prevented me from noticing the reasons that I felt bad
when I did and from appreciating the effects of my own choices. 146

142. See KRAMER, supra note 59, at 18–19.
143. Id.
144. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 255.
145. As Carl Elliott asks, “Who is better off: the contented slave, or the angry one? The
man who sins happily, or the one who feels guilt and shame?” Carl Elliott, Medicate Your
Dissent, SPEAKEASY MAG. (2003), reprinted at www.tc.umn.edu/~ellio023/medicate.htm.
146. Katherine Sharpe, The Medication Generation, WALL STREET J., June 29, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303649504577493112618709108.html.
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Beyond the potential to cause problems for individuals, some
worry about the cumulative effect of these practices on society. For
example, Kramer observed that Prozac caused his patient, Tess, to
become less serious. 147 One of the “symptoms” Prozac seemed to
relieve for Tess was her “heightened awareness of the needs of
others.” 148 She was a happier individual as a result, but diminished
concern for others becomes troubling when multiplied across the
eleven percent of Americans age twelve or older who
take antidepressants. 149
Emerging technologies may provide new opportunities to sever
emotional responses from external circumstances. For example, the
potential to dampen, or even erase, memories could provide great
relief to people who have experienced trauma, or even merely sad or
embarrassing episodes. But painful memories also serve important
purposes—to individuals as well as to society at large. In response to
a New York Times story about memory-erasure research, one
reader opined:
Six years ago, I watched both of my teenage boys die, several hours
apart, after our car was struck by a speeding patrol car. . . . I don’t
mean to judge the way in which others should treat (or be treated
for) their own personal tragedies. But for me, I needed to retain
every detail of my memory, not only for the manslaughter trial that
followed a year and a half later but also for my own well-being. I
now share my experience, in vivid detail, with police officers and
recruits, hoping to prevent this from happening to others.
Although it’s painful to relive that night and its aftermath, doing so
helps me feel that I am doing something positive with
this tragedy. 150

If we medicate away shame and remorse for bad decisions or
behavior, we may fail to learn important lessons and repeat mistakes
or bad acts we might have avoided. 151 While few would begrudge

147. KRAMER, supra note 59, at 9.
148. Id. at 10.
149. Pratt, supra note 56, at 5.
150. Michelle Norton Spicer, Letter: The Quest to Forget, N.Y. TIMES MAG., April 18,
2004, at 6.
151. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 232 (“the power to numb or eliminate the
psychic sting of certain memories risks eroding the responsibility we take for our own actions—
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soldiers an intervention that might relieve them of some of the
mental traumas of war, their memories of those horrors serve
important purposes, as do the memories of Holocaust survivors and
witnesses of other atrocities. 152 As the President’s Council on
Bioethics asked, “Would the community as a whole—would the
human race—be served by such a mass numbing of this terrible but
indispensable memory? Do those who suffer evil have a duty to
remember and bear witness, lest we all forget the very horrors that
haunt them?” 153
II. REGULATING IDENTITY-MODIFYING INTERVENTIONS
The United States’ existing legal structures governing medical
interventions are designed to regulate treatments for illnesses.154
Within that context, the prime consideration is ensuring that these
treatments are safe to use—i.e., that they promote human health. In
philosopher Norman Daniels’ terms, we can (nearly) all agree on the
value of treating illnesses irrespective of our comprehensive moral
doctrines. 155 So when presented with an intervention that treats
cancer, we generally do not feel compelled to ask whether shrinking
tumors should be permitted. Rather, the aim of regulation is to
ensure that the treatment is safe and effective.
By contrast, using biological interventions to modify healthy
brains and bodies is often highly controversial. 156 Although many
people highly desire these interventions, others condemn them as
immoral or socially detrimental and wish to restrict them. Catholics

since we would never have to face the harsh judgment of our own conscience . . . or the
memory of others.”).
152. Id. at 230–31.
153. Id. at 231.
154. For example, the Controlled Substances Act “allows prescription of drugs only if
they have a ‘currently accepted medical use,’ 21 U.S.C. § 812(b); requires a ‘medical purpose’
for dispensing the least controlled substances of those on the schedules, § 829(c); and, in its
reporting provision, defines a ‘valid prescription’ as one ‘issued for a legitimate medical
purpose,’ § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii).” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
155. DANIELS, supra note 103, at 155. But see Paul Vitello, Christian Science Church
Seeks Truce With Modern Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A20 (noting that,
historically, Christian Scientists have rejected using medical treatment to promote health).
156. DANIELS, supra note 103, at 154.
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believe contraception interferes with God’s will. 157 In the 1800s,
Teetotalers argued drinking alcohol leads to “idleness, disorder,
[and] pauperism.” 158 While students diagnosed with ADHD are
often encouraged to take Adderall to help them study, healthy
students who use the drug for the same purpose risk academic and
criminal sanctions. 159 But because our existing regulatory systems
were not designed with nontherapeutic practices in mind, these
systems are largely blind to these disputes. Accordingly, as we
develop new medical technologies and practices that seem designed
to change identities rather than treat illnesses, calls are growing to
expand regulatory systems to address concerns other than
protecting health. 160
Section A of this part briefly outlines various forms of medical
regulation in the United States and describes how most of these
efforts are at least ostensibly directed at protecting the health of
users of medical interventions. It also notes that legislation
restricting reproduction technologies represents a key exception to
this general emphasis. Section B describes calls to expand regulatory
authority to regulate nontherapeutic medical interventions on the
basis of broader moral concerns.
A. Existing Medical Regulation Is Largely Blind to Moral Concerns
Beyond Protecting Health
Medical practices are regulated in the United States through a
patchwork of overlapping federal and state laws and regulations,
courts, and professional associations. Although these regulatory
activities take a variety of forms, they generally share—at least on the
surface—a common animating purpose: protecting the health of
people who undergo biological interventions.

157. See,
e.g.,
Catholic
Answers,
Birth
Control,
www.catholic.com/library/Birth_Control.asp (“Contraception is wrong because it’s a
deliberate violation of the design God built into the human race, often referred to as
‘natural law.’”).
158. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887).
159. See, e.g., Allie Grasgreen, Are Prescription Drugs ‘Cheating’?, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
(Oct. 13, 2010), www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/10/13/wesleyan#ixzz38nPELRJ4
(indicating Wesleyan University’s Code of Non-Academic Conduct deems the “misuse or
abuse” of prescription drugs a violation of the school’s student honor code).
160. See infra note 208.
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1. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which
regulates the sale of drugs and medical devices, is designed to ensure
that drugs and medical devices are safe to use. 161 One of the key ways
it does this is by requiring manufacturers to obtain approval from the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before marketing their
products. 162 When a pharmaceutical company wants to sell a new
drug, it must submit a New Drug Application and provide evidence
that the drug is safe and “will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have.” 163 The manufacturer also must provide the
FDA with the company’s proposed labeling for the drug, “which
includes, inter alia, all proposed claims about the drug’s risks and
benefits, as well as adequate directions for use.” 164 If the FDA
determines that the drug is sufficiently safe and is effective for the
purposes described in the drug’s label, the agency issues an order
approving the application, allowing the manufacturer to market the
drug in a manner consistent with its label. 165 The FDCA also protects
patient health by, among other things, regulating how drugs and
medical devices are manufactured, barring the sale of misbranded or
adulterated drugs, and monitoring reports of adverse events
experienced by users of these products. 166
Because the focus of the FDCA is to protect patient health,
neither the Act nor the FDA seeks to limit the use of medical
interventions to therapeutic purposes. For example, the agency
approved Botox for the “treatment” of “severe frown lines”—a
condition that could hardly be considered a disease, and which poses
no apparent threat to human health. 167 The FDA also does not seek

161. Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA (June 1981)
www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm056044.htm.
162. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012); see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
163. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
164. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998)
(citing part of 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)).
165. 21 U.S.C § 355(d).
166. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 725.
167. FDA, FDA Approves Botox Cosmetic to Improve the Appearance of Crow’s Feet Lines
(Sept.
11,
2013),
www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm367662.htm.
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to prevent doctors from prescribing medications for nontherapeutic
uses. Once the FDA approves a drug to treat a particular indication,
doctors generally may prescribe it for other purposes as they see fit. 168
So while the FDA approved the drug Adderall as a treatment for
ADHD, the FDCA does not prevent doctors from prescribing it to
healthy students who want to enhance their concentration when
doing homework. 169 On the contrary, so-called “off-label”
prescribing
is
very
common,
particularly
for
psychotropic medications. 170
Nor does the FDA believe its mandate encompasses addressing
concerns like fairness, coercion, or authenticity. The Agency has
categorically denied that “moral, religious, or ethical issues” fall
within its purview. 171 The FDA has made this abundantly clear on
multiple occasions, most notably in connection with its approval of
human growth hormone (HGH) as a treatment for children who are
very short, but do not suffer from a known health deficit. 172 In
approving Eli Lilly & Company’s application to promote HGH to
help these short (but healthy) children grow taller, the FDA advisory
committee evaluating the drug expressly rejected the idea that it
should consider issues beyond its safety and efficacy:
[A]ny decision that’s made with regard to growth hormone in this
instance will be based upon a judgment of a favorable balance of
risk versus benefit for the proposed indication, and that would not,
in our minds, be setting a broad policy with regard, generally, to
the use of drugs for cosmetic purposes. I’d also propose that it is
not the purpose of this meeting to debate the merits of approvals of
other drugs for what some—usually those unaffected by the target

168. U.S v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Once FDA-approved,
prescription drugs can be prescribed by doctors for both FDA-approved and -unapproved uses;
the FDA generally does not regulate how physicians use approved drugs.”).
169. Lawrence Diller, The Homework Pill, HUFFINGTON POST, June 5, 2012,
www.huffingtonpost.com/larry-diller/adderallhomework_b_1549595.html.
170. David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023–24 (2006) (finding that 73 percent of off-label
prescriptions by office-based doctors—and 94 percent of prescriptions for psychiatric
therapies—had little or no scientific support).
171. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA’s Response to Public Comment on the
Animal Cloning Risk Assessment, Risk Management Plan, and Guidance for Industry (July 23,
2014), www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalCloning/ucm055491.htm.
172. Fox, supra note 97, at 1139–40.
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condition—might construe as cosmetic purposes. And I think it’s
safe to say that we should concede that once demonstrated to be
safe and effective, the choice of whether to attempt therapy for, for
example, baldness, or mild acne, or even overweight is up to
doctors, patients and their families as they weigh the potential
benefits of the therapy against the potential risks. 173

2. The Controlled Substances Act
The federal government also regulates drugs through the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). As discussed below, in practice the
CSA often seems to serve as a way of expressing moral
condemnation of certain uses of drugs. But on its face the Act’s
primary objective is to combat drug abuse and addiction, which it
seeks to accomplish through “a comprehensive, closed regulatory
regime criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution,
dispensing, and possession” of numerous drugs, or “controlled
substances.” 174 Nothing in the Act purports, or appears designed, to
further
other
interests
like
ensuring
fairness
or
protecting authenticity.
Like the FDCA, the CSA is designed to regulate drugs based on
their health risks and benefits. The Act assigns controlled substances
to one of five schedules, ostensibly based on the drugs’ “potential for
abuse or dependence, their accepted medical use, and their accepted
safety for use under medical supervision.” 175 Schedule I includes
drugs that are considered to have “a high potential for abuse,” that
are deemed to have “no currently accepted medical use,” and that
allegedly cannot be used safely, even under medical supervision.176
Substances in Schedule II are considered to have accepted medical
uses, but also to pose safety risks and/or heightened potential for

173. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH, ENDOCRINOLOGIC AND METABOLIC DRUGS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING
(Food and Drug Administration Department of Health and Human Services ed., June
10, 2003).
174. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250; 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000); 21 U.S.C. §
844 (2012).
175. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 250; 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
176. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).
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abuse. 177 Drugs in Schedule I are banned; with very limited
exceptions for drug research and religious practices, their possession
is a crime. 178 Drugs in Schedules II through IV may be obtained
lawfully only by prescription. 179
Unlike the FDCA, the CSA gives federal officials some authority
to regulate the practice of medicine. 180 To lawfully prescribe
scheduled drugs, doctors must register with the Attorney General. 181
The Attorney General may revoke a physician’s registration upon
finding (among other things) that the practitioner “has committed
such acts as would render his registration . . . inconsistent with the
public interest.” 182 Drug Enforcement Agency regulations provide
that in order to be “effective”—i.e., to comport with the CSA—“[a]
prescription for a controlled substance . . . must be issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional practice.” 183 If a doctor writes a
prescription for a controlled substance that is not for a “legitimate
medical purpose,” the prescription is invalid and the doctor can be
subject to the CSA’s criminal penalties. 184
On their face, these broadly-worded provisions appear to give
the Attorney General the power to rely on considerations other than
safety to determine that prescribing drugs for nontherapeutic
purposes is not legitimate. 185 However, the Supreme Court has
determined that the CSA grants the Attorney General only very

177. Douglas J. Behr, Prescription Drug Control Under the Federal Controlled Substances
Act: A Web of Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Law Controls, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 41, 51–52 (1994).
178. Scott Gast, Who Defines “Legitimate Medical Practice?” Lessons Learned from the
Controlled Substances Act, Physician-Assisted Suicide, & Oregon v. Ashcroft, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 261, 266 (2002).
179. Id.
180. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012).
181. Id. § 822(a)(2).
182. Id. § 824(a)(4).
183. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2015).
184. Id.
185. At least one scholar has interpreted the CSA in this way. See Katherine DrabiakSyed, Reining In the Pharmacological Enhancement Train: We Should Remain Vigilant about
Regulatory Standards for Prescribing Controlled Substances, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 275–
76 (2011) (arguing that prescribing a Schedule IV drug to stimulate a patient’s focus or
concentration constitutes an enhancement purpose that may violate the CSA regulation’s
“legitimate medical purpose” requirement).
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narrow authority to regulate the practice of medicine—specifically, to
prevent doctors from acting as drug dealers. 186 In Gonzales v. Oregon,
the Supreme Court addressed an action by the U.S. Attorney
General declaring that assisting suicide, as Oregon state law
permitted, was outside the scope of legitimate medical practice and
therefore violated the Controlled Substances Act. 187 In invalidating
the Attorney General’s action, the Court rejected the federal
government’s contention that the words “medicine” and “medical”
“ineluctably refer[] to a healing or curative art,” such that drugs
prescribed for nontherapeutic purposes were necessarily outside the
scope of legitimate medical practice. 188 The Court concluded that the
purpose of the CSA’s prescription requirement was not to limit
medical practice to therapeutic purposes, but to protect patients’
health by “ensur[ing] patients use controlled substances under the
supervision of a doctor so as to prevent addiction and
recreational abuse.” 189
3. State regulation
States also regulate the prescribing of drugs, as well as other
medical practices, through state statutes, medical licensing bodies,
and tort law. 190 As at the federal level, however, state medical
regulation is generally aimed at protecting patient safety, rather than
restricting interventions on moral grounds.

186. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70 (2006) (“The [CSA] and our case law
amply support the conclusion that Congress regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors
from using their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and
trafficking as conventionally understood. Beyond this, however, the statute manifests no intent
to regulate the practice of medicine generally.”).
187. 66 Fed. Reg. 56, 607–56, 608 (Nov. 9, 2001).
188. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 272.
189. Id. at 274. At oral argument, several Justices questioned whether the CSA permits
states to include nontherapeutic practices—like giving steroids to bodybuilders, or prescribing
drugs simply to make people happier—within the scope of legitimate medical practice. Oral
Argument in Gonzales v. Oregon, 21 ISSUES L. & MED. 213, 226 (Roberts, J.), 226
(Ginsburg, J.), 227 (O’Connor, J.), 233 (Scalia, J.).
190. Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 427, 446–53 (2015).
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Although the FDCA preempts most state efforts to regulate the
sale of FDA-approved drugs and devices, 191 states regulate controlled
substances in ways that mirror the federal CSA. 192 All states impose
criminal penalties for possessing or distributing Schedule I drugs or
possessing, distributing, or prescribing other controlled substances
without a valid prescription. 193 While states may impose additional
restrictions on how doctors prescribe scheduled drugs, state drug
laws are generally consonant with the CSA. 194
Unlike the federal government, states play a significant role in
regulating medical practice. States require physicians to be licensed
by state medical boards before practicing medicine, and these boards
can revoke physicians’ licenses if their practices are deemed unethical
or outside the bounds of accepted practice. 195 States also regulate the
practice of medicine through malpractice suits, which enable patients
harmed by medical interventions to obtain damages from physicians
who breach the standard of care. 196
However, neither licensing boards nor tort law seeks to constrain
doctors from providing nontherapeutic interventions, or to regulate
these interventions on moral grounds beyond protecting patient
safety. Rather, these forms of regulation allow the medical profession
to define for itself the scope of legitimate practice. For example, a
plastic surgery patient could not recover in a malpractice action on
the grounds that the procedure the doctor performed was not

191. Tamsen Valoir & Shubha Ghosh, FDA Preemption of Drug and Device Labeling:
Who Should Decide What Goes on a Drug Label?, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 555 (2011).
192. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 251 (“[t]he CSA explicitly contemplates a role for the States
in regulating controlled substances.”); 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012).
193. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306 (“Schedules of controlled substances”);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3304 (“Prohibited Acts”).
194. Recent state marijuana laws that contradict federal prohibitions are a notable
exception. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (legalizing marijuana possession); 29
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401(3) (2013) (also legalizing marijuana possession); Robert A.
Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to
Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009).
195. See, e.g., Katherine Drabiak-Syed, supra note 185, at 276 (citing TENN. CODE
ANN. § 63-6-214 (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 37: 1275, 1261 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4731.22 (2015)).
196. States also play a limited role in regulating FDA-approved drugs and devices
through tort litigation. While most state law tort suits based on harms caused by drugs and
devices are preempted by the FDCA, a few actions remain viable. See Valoir & Ghosh supra
note 191.
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therapeutic. Instead, tort liability typically hinges on whether the
doctor performed the procedure as other reasonably prudent plastic
surgeons would. 197 Similarly, state medical boards can suspend or
revoke physicians’ licenses for things like gross negligence, repeated
negligent acts, or incompetence—again, defined by reference to how
reasonably prudent doctors conduct themselves. 198 But as long as the
patient consented to the intervention and the doctor performed it
competently, it matters very little whether the doctor provided the
intervention for a therapeutic purpose.
On their face, some state laws suggest otherwise. For example,
California’s Health and Safety Code provides that a physician may
prescribe controlled substances “only when in good faith he or she
believes the disease, ailment, injury, or infirmity requires the
treatment.” 199 Taken literally, this provision appears to bar physicians
from prescribing controlled substances for nontherapeutic purposes.
Presumably that would be unwelcome news to the state’s many
doctors who prescribe Botox to individuals who want fewer
wrinkles. 200 In practice, however, these state laws operate in a manner
similar to the CSA’s requirement that doctors only issue
prescriptions for “legitimate medical purpose[s]”—i.e., to prosecute
doctors who act as “dealers” of narcotics and other addictive
prescription drugs. To make out a case under these laws, prosecutors
must show indicia of drug dealing—such as charging patients by the
volume of narcotics prescribed, or prescribing narcotics without first
examining patients. 201 A review of state court opinions identified no
cases in which doctors were prosecuted for prescribing drugs for
nontherapeutic purposes where these other indicia of drug dealing
were not also present.

197. Anne Bloom, Plastic Injuries, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 759, 784 (2014) (“[I]n plastic
surgery litigation, what matters is whether the plastic surgeon’s practices deviated significantly
from the practices of other plastic surgeons in the same field.”).
198. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2234 (2015).
199. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11210 (2015); see also Rules of the Tennessee
State Board of Medical Examiners, Ch. 0880-02-.14(6)(a)(3) (defining “[n]on-therapeutic in
nature or manner” as “[a] medical use or purpose that is not legitimate.”).
200. Medical Board of California, Frequently Asked Questions - Cosmetic Treatments,
www.mbc.ca.gov/Licensees/Cosmetic_Treatments_FAQ.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
201. 21 C.F.R. 1306 (2006); United States v. Rosen, 582 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1978).
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4. A notable exception: reproduction technology
While most medical regulation emphasizes protecting human
health, in the case of reproduction technologies governments have
repeatedly sought to restrict nontherapeutic interventions to enforce
a particular conception of morality. Sometimes these restrictions are
framed as safety measures but in fact seem intended to bar the use of
these technologies, irrespective of whether they threaten women’s
health. For example, in 2011 the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (CDER) determined that a contraceptive intervention
known as Plan B was effective and could be used safely by girls of all
ages, such that it should be available “over the counter” at any age
rather than requiring a prescription. 202 In an unprecedented action,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services overruled the FDA’s
determination. Secretary Sebelius framed her action in terms of
protecting health, claiming there was insufficient data to establish
that younger girls could use the drug safely. But many people believe
the Secretary’s interference was not based on safety considerations,
but rather was “a politically motivated effort to avoid riling religious
groups and others opposed to making birth control available to
girls.” 203 Indeed, a federal district court thoroughly repudiated the
Secretary’s
action
as
“politically
motivated
[and]
204
scientifically unjustified.”
Other legislative actions regulating abortion procedures are
expressly based on moral condemnation of these practices. The
federal government and the overwhelming majority of states prohibit
doctors from performing certain abortion procedures, generally after
a designated period of fetal gestation. 205 Under the federal PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, any physician who knowingly
performs an intact dilation and extraction—a procedure used to
terminate some late-term pregnancies—faces up to two years in
202. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
203. Gardiner Harris, White House and the FDA Often at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2012 at A1.
204. Tummino, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
205. See, e.g., The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–105,
117 Stat. 1201, (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003)) (prohibiting a later-term
abortion procedure); GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES ON LATER-TERM
ABORTIONS (Nov. 1, 2015), www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf
(summarizing state restrictions on late-term abortion procedures).
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prison and/or a criminal fine. 206 The prohibition is expressly
motivated by moral condemnation of a procedure that Congress has
deemed nontherapeutic. The Act includes a Congressional finding
that “[a] moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the
practice of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and
inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and should
be prohibited.” 207
In the present context these efforts to restrict reproduction
technologies are noteworthy because they provide concrete examples
of regulating nontherapeutic medical interventions on moral
grounds other than protecting safety. In contrast to the FDA’s
determinations regarding the safety and efficacy of medical
interventions, these actions are not based on objective assessments of
scientific data. Rather they are highly politicized, and subject to
shifting public opinion and the differing priorities of new
administrations. As discussed below, these actions also intrude upon
deeply personal decisions that profoundly affect women’s ability to
control their own bodies and identities.
B. Proposals to Broaden the Scope of Medical Regulation
Some worry that existing regulatory systems focus too narrowly
on protecting health, and have called for expanding the scope of
federal regulation of medicine to address broader social and ethical
concerns. 208 Francis Fukuyama argues that new medical technologies

206. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
207. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Section 2(1), 117 Stat. at 1201.
208. See, e.g., Secretary of Health and Human Services’ Advisory Committee on
Genetics, Health and Society, Public Comments on Preliminary Final Recommendations on
Oversight of Genetic Testing, 65 Fed. Reg. 21,094, 21,095 (Apr. 19, 2000) (noting that the
FDA’s review process does not consider “the ethical and social implications” of genetic tests
and arguing that “[t]he Secretary should consider the development of a mechanism to ensure
the identification and appropriate review of tests that raise major social and ethical concerns.”);
FUKUYAMA, supra note 3 at 213 (advocating the creation of “a new agency to oversee the
approval of new medicines, procedures, and technologies for human health” with the power
“to make judgments about the technology’s social and ethical implications.”); Fox, supra note
97 (advocating expanding the FDA’s mandate to consider ethical concerns and to restrict
access to interventions that could be used for enhancement purposes); Gary Marchant et al.,
Integrating Social and Ethical Concerns Into Regulatory Decision-Making for Emerging
Technologies, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 345 (2010) (advocating incorporating broader
ethical concerns into the FDA’s review of drugs and devices); Ellen M. McGee, Should There
Be A Law? Brain Chips: Ethical and Policy Issues, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 81 (2007) (arguing
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threaten human dignity and a human nature that he believes is,
“conjointly with religion, what defines our most basic values.”209
Fukuyama argues it is imperative to go beyond merely exploring the
ethical issues raised by emerging medical technologies, and to
quickly create regulatory institutions that are empowered to limit the
use of enhancement technologies. 210 He urges countries to “regulate
the development and use of technology politically, setting up
institutions that will discriminate between those technological
advances that promote human flourishing, and those that pose a
threat to human dignity and well-being.” 211
Noting that the FDA has neither the legal authority nor the
institutional capacity to address concerns beyond safety and efficacy,
Fukuyama advocates creating “a new agency to oversee the approval
of new medicines, procedures, and technologies for human

FDA review “is inadequate to consider the social and policy questions raised by . . .
enhancement devices” and urging the creation of new regulatory systems to address these
issues); Ellen M. McGee and Gerald Q. Maguire, Jr., Becoming Borg to Become Immortal:
Regulating Brain Implant Technologies, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 291 (2007)
(“No system exists for consideration of the extraordinary social and policy questions raised
by . . . devices when used for enhancement. This level of scrutiny should be added and
considered the equivalent of an environmental impact statement.”); Leon R. Kass, The New
Biology: What Price Relieving Man’s Estate?, 174 SCI. 779, 787 (1971) (advocating attempts
“to detect and diminish the social costs of biomedical advances by intelligent institutional
regulation” and arguing that “[c]oncepts of ‘risk’ and ‘cost’ need to be broadened to
include . . . social and ethical consequences.”); Eric Chan, Comment, The Food and Drug
Administration and the Future of the Brain-Computer Interface: Adapting FDA Device Law to
the Challenges of Human-Machine Enhancement, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
117 (2007) (noting that the FDA does not address the ethical issues raised by enhancement,
and advocating expanding the Agency’s authority to regulate enhancements on the basis of
moral concerns unrelated to safety); Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic
Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 689 (1999) (“In seeking to regulate genetic
enhancement, in any event, society must attend not only to the traditional regulatory concerns
of safety and efficacy, but to the problems of social inequality and cheating posed by the lack of
universal access to enhancement technologies.”); Whitehouse et. al., supra note 38, at 21
(“[T]he licensing process of the FDA focuses on clinical safety and efficacy. The agency has
little experience with evaluating the types of social costs and benefits that regulating cognitive
enhancers would entail. At the least, we would need to supplement the normal review process
of the agency so that it considered these issues, and provide the agency with the expertise to
do so. The former might well require a change in the enabling legislation of the agency.”).
209. FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 7.
210. Id. at 203–04.
211. Id. at 182.
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health.” 212 This new agency would “adjudicate among competing
ethical claims” in order to distinguish between “legitimate” and
“illegitimate” uses of medical technology, and would be empowered
to restrict or prohibit practices it deemed illegitimate. 213 The broader
scope of this new entity’s mandate would require new staffing,
including “not just the doctors and scientists who staff the FDA and
oversee clinical trials for new drugs, but other societal voices that are
prepared to make judgments about the technology’s social and
ethical implications.” 214
Other scholars have advocated incorporating this kind of ethical
machinery within the FDA. 215 Gary Marchant and his co-authors
have argued that although the regulatory approval stage of
technology development offers “the best opportunity to expressly
and formally consider the ethical and social impacts of new
technologies,” 216 legal and practical restraints prevent federal
regulatory agencies from addressing these issues:
Given that many of the public concerns about such technologies
are ethical or social in nature, it seems inappropriate from both a
normative and instrumental perspective for regulatory agencies to
continue to disregard such concerns because they are outside of
their stated regulatory missions. . . . [I]n a democracy, citizens
should have the right to raise moral and social concerns about a
proposed government action, and to have those concerns
considered and addressed by government decision-makers. 217

212. Id. at 213–14 (noting that “[t]he FDA can disapprove a procedure only on the
grounds of effectiveness and safety,” and the Agency “is not set up to make politically sensitive
decisions” about the broader ethical implications of enhancements).
213. See, e.g., id. at 213. While Fukuyama is primarily concerned with regulating genetic
modification of children—interventions that raise issues beyond the scope of this paper—his
arguments also extend to the regulation of pharmaceutical interventions. Id. at 41–56.
214. Id. at 214.
215. See, e.g., Whitehouse et al., supra note 38, at 21 (“[T]he licensing process of the
FDA focuses on clinical safety and efficacy. The agency has little experience with evaluating the
types of social costs and benefits that regulating cognitive enhancers would entail. At the least,
we would need to supplement the normal review process of the agency so that it considered
these issues, and provide the agency with the expertise to do so. The former might well require
a change in the enabling legislation of the agency.”).
216. Marchant, et al., supra note 208, at 349.
217. Id.
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Marchant suggests the FDA could create an “ethics review board”
similar to its existing advisory committees that provide scientific
advice. The board “would provide comparable advice on the ethical
and social dimensions of the agency’s actions”—including such issues
as new technologies’ “potential use for enhancing humans, the
‘unnatural’ nature of some of the interventions made possible by
new technologies, and the commoditization or destruction of human
or animal ‘life,’ however defined.” 218
Dov Fox has similarly advocated expanding the FDA’s mandate
to include addressing ethical concerns about medical products that
can be used for nontherapeutic purposes. Fox proposes creating a
new administrative process within the FDA in which drugs and
devices deemed to have enhancement potential would be
“earmarked for special analysis and consideration.” 219 That analysis
would include such considerations as “unfairness in competitive
activities, inequality of access to positional advantages, perpetuation
of social prejudice, threats to individual agency, identity, and
authenticity, social conformity and subtle coercion, and negative
externalities when such technologies are pursued collectively.” 220
When the FDA determined an intervention would threaten adverse
social consequences or important values, the agency would have
authority to limit how—or whether—the intervention could be used.
Common to these proposals is the idea that regulators should
distinguish therapeutic practices from nontherapeutic, and subject
the latter to heightened restrictions. While therapies would continue
to be evaluated based on safety, enhancements could be restricted on
the basis of other moral objections.
III. THE HAZARDS OF MEDICAL REGULATION AS SOCIAL
CONTROL
As new medical technologies proliferate, offering ever more
powerful and precise ways to shape identities, calls to regulate on
moral grounds will likely grow louder. 221 Several observers have

218. Id. at 347, 360.
219. Fox, supra note 97, at 1194–95.
220. Id. at 1195.
221. See, e.g., Marchant et. al, supra note 208, at 348 (“As the number of available drugs
addressing cognitive performance (e.g., Alzheimer’s treatments) is expected to expand over the
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already raised the prospect of urine testing of students and
employees to prevent cognitive “doping”—an approach endorsed by
Britain’s Academy of Medical Sciences. 222 And although
interventions to dampen or edit memories have only begun to be
tested in humans, 223 the mere prospect of these technologies has
spawned considerable concern, as well as discussion of possible
legal restrictions. 224
But even if one accepts critics’ arguments that enhancement
technologies can have troubling moral or social implications, it
would be a mistake to conclude that we should restrict them on that
basis. Many morally problematic practices are legal. Sometimes we
allow them because we do not believe legal restrictions would be
effective in deterring these practices or addressing their potential
harms. We allow other practices because, although many people find
them morally objectionable, they are considered personal choices
that lie within individuals’ rights to self-determination. Before vastly
expanding government’s authority to interfere with individuals’
medical decisions, it would be prudent to examine whether legal
restrictions would be effective in achieving their aims, and whether
the aims themselves are proper. As it happens, the United States
already has substantial experience in regulating nontherapeutic
medical interventions on moral grounds, and these efforts have been
both ineffective and unduly intrusive.
A. Restricting Biological Interventions on Moral Grounds Is Ineffective
1. Existing drug prohibitions are based largely on moral condemnation
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, members of the
temperance movement unabashedly touted the moral underpinnings

next decade, the inability of FDA to consider factors other than safety and efficacy will become
increasingly problematic and limiting.”).
222. HUMAN ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra note 93; Ian Sample,
Exam Cheating Alert Over Brain Drugs, THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2008),
www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/may/22/drugs.medicalresearch;
Rebecca
Roache,
Enhancement and Cheating, 2 EXPOSITIONS 153 (2008); Vince Cakic, Smart Drugs for
Cognitive Enhancement: Ethical and Pragmatic Considerations in the Era of Cosmetic
Neurology, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 611 (2009); Whitehouse et al., supra note 38.
223. Kroes et al., supra note 82.
224. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88 at 214–34; Kolber, supra note 87.
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of their prohibitionist agenda. In The License Cases, counsel for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts defended laws restricting alcohol
sales by arguing:
The train of evils which mark the progress of intemperance is too
obvious to require comment. It brings with it degradation of
character, impairs the moral and physical energies, wastes the
health, increases the number of paupers and criminals, undermines
the morals, and sinks its victims to the lowest depths of vice
and profligacy. 225

The Volstead Act, which implemented alcohol prohibition under
the Eighteenth Amendment, did not ban alcohol entirely. Rather, it
expressly allowed alcohol to be prescribed by a physician who “in
good faith believes that the use of such liquor as a medicine by [a
patient] is necessary and will afford relief to him from some known
ailment.” 226 It also allowed alcohol to be used by “a rabbi, minister
of the gospel, priest” and other religious officials “for sacramental
purposes, or like religious rights.” 227 In other words, the problem the
Act sought to address was not that alcohol was inherently too
dangerous to be used, but that particular uses were viewed as posing
threats to the moral and social order.
While the Controlled Substances Act lacks the overt moralism of
the temperance movement—and while the motivations behind the
“war on drugs” are admittedly numerous and complex—the
criminalization of “recreational” drug use likewise appears to reflect
moral condemnation of practices that are “perceived to violate
fundamental moral values.” 228 Although the Act purports to restrict
access to controlled substances to protect users’ health, the
incongruous scheduling of many drugs appears designed instead as a
means of combatting social deviance—“an aspirational endeavor . . .
[that] seeks to forge notions of whom and what we should be
225. License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 521; see also id. at 577 (Taney, J.) (“[I]f any State
deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated to
produce idleness, vice, or debauchery, I see nothing in the Constitution of the United States to
prevent it from regulating and restraining the traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it
thinks proper.”).
226. Volstead Act, ch. 85, tit. II, 41 Stat. 305, §7 (1919).
227. Id.
228. Kimani Paul-Emile, Making Sense of Drug Regulation: A Theory of Law for Drug
Control Policy, 19 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 710 (2009–2010).
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individually and collectively.” 229 In particular, Schedule I ostensibly
includes only drugs that are considered to have “a high potential for
abuse,” that are deemed to have “no currently accepted medical
use,” and that cannot be used safely, even under medical
supervision. 230 Yet that category includes several drugs that have
known therapeutic uses and that appear to pose less potential for
abuse than drugs in lower schedules—or, in the case of alcohol and
cigarettes, no schedule at all. 231
Marijuana is the most notable example. At the time of the CSA’s
passage, marijuana was placed in Schedule I pending a report to be
issued by a National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse.232
The Commission concluded that the drug posed little danger of
physical or psychological harm, and that “the actual and potential
harm of use of the drug is not great enough to justify intrusion by
the criminal law into private behavior.” 233 But rather than accepting
the findings of the Commission it had created, the Nixon
administration rejected these findings and left marijuana in Schedule
I. In audio recordings of Nixon’s Oval Office conversations about
the Commission’s work, the President drew a curious distinction
between drinking to “have a good time” and smoking marijuana to
“get high,” arguing that the latter was (along with homosexuality)
immoral and “the enem[y] of strong societies.” 234
Marijuana remains in Schedule I today, while cocaine,
methamphetamine, and other narcotics and stimulants are in
Schedule II. These prescription drugs pose substantial health threats
to users, including a high potential for addiction and fatal overdoses.
By contrast, an Institute of Medicine (IOM) report commissioned
by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
determined that “marijuana’s abuse potential appears relatively small

229. Id. at 709.
230. 21 U.S.C § 812(b)(1).
231. Paul-Emile, supra note 228, at 698.
232. Pub. L. No. 91–513, § 601 Part F, 84 Stat. 1236, 1280–81 (1970).
233. THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG
ABUSE,
MARIHUANA:
A
SIGNAL
OF
MISUNDERSTANDING
(1972),
www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/nc/ncmenu.htm.
234. Audio Tape: Presidential Recordings, Tape 498, Part I, (May, 1971) (available at
http://millercenter.org/presidentialrecordings/rmn-e498a)
(transcribed
at
www.csdp.org/research/nixonpot.txt).
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and certainly within manageable limits for patients under the care of
a physician.” 235 While more than twenty-two thousand people die in
the United States each year from prescription drug overdoses, 236 the
IOM found that “[t]o our knowledge no marijuana user has ever
died of such an overdose.” 237
Moreover, while Schedule I is ostensibly reserved for drugs that
have no medical uses, there is considerable evidence that marijuana
can offer substantial therapeutic benefits 238—despite the Drug
Enforcement Administration’s hard-fought campaign to obstruct
research aimed at investigating the drug’s therapeutic qualities.239
Belying the claim that marijuana has “no currently accepted medical
use,” many reputable medical associations and patient advocacy
groups have affirmed marijuana’s therapeutic value and twenty-three
states permit the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. 240
Other banned drugs—including psilocybin, LSD, and MDMA—
have shown significant therapeutic promise, and there is little
evidence these drugs could not be used safely under appropriate
medical supervision. 241 The assignment of these drugs to Schedule I
appears to be based not on objective assessments of their safety for

235. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE
BASE 58 (1999).
236. Sabrina Tavernise, Overdose Deaths Continue to Climb, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2013,
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/us/overdose-deaths-continue-to-climb.html?_r=0.
237. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 235, at 50.
238. Paul-Emile, supra note 228, at 732 n.174.
239. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE & MAPS, THE DEA: FOUR DECADES OF IMPEDING AND
REJECTING SCIENCE 2 (2014), https://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPAMAPS_DEA_Science_Final.pdf (describing tactics the DEA has used “to maintain the existing,
scientifically unsupported drug scheduling system and to obstruct research that might alter
current drug schedules.”).
240. See, e.g., NORML, Health Organizations Supporting Immediate Legal Access to
Medical
Marijuana,
http://norml.org/component/zoo/item/detailedreference?category_id=734 (last visited Nov. 4, 2015); 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and
DC,
PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last visited Nov.
4, 2015) (listing states that have legalized marijuana for medicinal purposes).
241. Lauren Slater, How Psychedelic Drugs Can Help Patients Face Death, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Apr. 20, 2012, at 56 (describing research at Johns Hopkins, NYU, and elsewhere into
using psilocybin and LSD to treat anxiety in terminally ill patients); MAPS, Treating PTSD
with MDMA-Assisted Psychotherapy: Research, www.mdmaptsd.org/research-category.html
(listing published studies suggesting MDMA can be an effective therapy for PTSD).
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human consumption, but on condemnation of altering consciousness
in particular ways.
2. Prohibition is costly and fails to deter forbidden practices
From Prohibition to the war on drugs, punitive efforts have been
ineffective in preventing people from using drugs to modify
consciousness in desired ways, despite the substantial risks these
practices sometimes entail for users. In 2007, there were more than
1.8 million arrests for drug law violations—a more than threefold
increase since 1980. 242 More than 80 percent of drug arrests in 2012
were for mere possession of a controlled substance. 243 Possessing or
distributing banned drugs can result in lengthy prison sentences,
asset forfeiture, termination of employment, and many other dire
consequences. 244 Yet, while the United States spends billions each
year on combatting the illegal drug trade, those expenditures appear
to do little to reduce the availability of drugs or consumer demand
for them. 245 “Drug users in the United States spend on the order of
$100 billion annually on cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and meth.”246
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, “[a]bout 40

242. BUREAU
OF
JUSTICE
STATISTICS,
DRUG
AND
CRIME
FACTS,
www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/tables/arrtot.cfm.
243. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 2012 – ARRESTS 1 (2013).
244. See, e.g., Martin Y. Iguchi, et al., Elements of Well-Being Affected By Criminalizing
The Drug User, 117 (Supp. 1) PUBLIC HEALTH REP. 146 (2002) (“State and federal policies
on drug felons may affect eight elements of personal and community well-being: children and
families, access to health benefits, access to housing benefits, access to assistance for higher
education, immigration status, employment, eligibility to vote, and drug use or recidivism.”);
Nora V. Demleitner, Collateral Damage: No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV.
1027 (2002).
245. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET: FY 2015 FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/press-releases/ondcp_fy16_budget_
highlights.pdf (in 2014, Congress allocated $25.2 billion “to reduce drug use and its
consequences”); The NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, SHOVELING UP II: THE IMPACT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE ON STATE
BUDGETS 58 (2009) (“While international efforts to step up drug seizures may affect
availability, price, and consequences associated with a particular drug (i.e., cocaine or heroin),
CASA was unable to find evidence that such strategies have an overall impact on reducing
substance abuse and addiction or its costs to government.”).
246. BEAU KILMER ET AL., WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS: 20002010 103 (2014).
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percent of high school seniors admit to having taken some illegal
drug in the last year—up from thirty percent two decades ago.”247
Despite that increasing demand, the average price of a gram of pure
cocaine has declined by 74 percent over the past thirty years,
suggesting an enormous increase in supply of the drug. 248 In sum,
despite the seemingly minimal benefits of many banned drugs, the
incredibly harsh penalties for their sale and possession, and the
enormous investments in trying to prevent their use, these drugs
continue to be widely available and commonly used.
The difficulty of limiting access to desired drugs would be
profoundly magnified in the context of interventions that offer more
tangible benefits than the euphoria of cocaine or heroin. For many
people the desire to transform one’s identity is so compelling that
they will go to incredible lengths, and assume great risks, to make
these changes. 249 People who pursue sex changes often undergo
multiple surgeries and take hormones for the rest of their lives.
Athletes who use steroids must not only accept the health risks of
these drugs, but must undertake punishing workouts to obtain the
drugs’ desired effects. For others, the pursuit of extrinsic rewards—
such as competitive advantages in school or the workplace—may
prove equally powerful. Already, people from all walks of life are
taking prescription drugs in hopes of gaining a competitive edge by
enhancing their cognition. 250 If millions of people are willing to risk
lengthy prison sentences to experience fleeting euphoria, presumably
millions more would be willing to do so in order to obtain the more
significant benefits enhancements may offer. 251
Moreover, unlike Schedule I drugs, most existing enhancements
have—and future enhancements are likely to have—approved

247. Eduardo Porter, Numbers Tell of Failure in Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at
B1 (citing THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, MONITORING THE FUTURE 2011 NATIONAL
SURVEY RESULTS, LONG-TERM TRENDS IN ANNUAL PREVALENCE OF USE OF VARIOUS
DRUGS IN GRADE 12 (2011), http://monitoringthefuture.org/data/11data/pr11t16.pdf).
248. Id.
249. ELLIOTT, supra note 1, at 39.
250. See supra notes 37–54 and accompanying text.
251. Sahakian & Morein-Zamir, supra note 39, at 1159 (“We believe it would be
difficult to stop the spread in use of cognitive enhancers given a global market in
pharmaceuticals with increasingly easy online access. The drive for self-enhancement of
cognition is likely to be as strong if not stronger than in the realms of ‘enhancement’ of beauty
and sexual function.”).
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therapeutic uses. 252 “Study drugs” like Ritalin and Adderall are FDAapproved as treatments for ADHD. Human growth hormone
(HGH) can make normal kids taller, but it was originally approved as
a treatment for pituitary problems. 253 Steroids can help bodybuilders
grow enormous muscles, but they can also help rebuild tissues that
have been weakened by injuries or illnesses. 254 While these drugs are
legally available only with a prescription, their sale and manufacture
is legal and common. Preventing people from using legal drugs in
unapproved ways would be considerably more difficult than
enforcing the ban on Schedule I drugs has been. Indeed, the wide
availability of legal painkillers and stimulants may explain why abuse
of prescription drugs is becoming more common than the use of
banned substances. 255
Relatedly, the challenge of restricting nontherapeutic practices
would be magnified by the fact that many enhancements may be
safer—or perceived as safer—than banned drugs. Unlike Schedule I
drugs, the FDA deems approved drugs to be safe enough for use in
humans. 256 In addition, the FDA regulates the production of
prescription drugs, providing users with assurances of quality and
non-adulteration that are absent for illegally manufactured
banned drugs. 257

252. See Maartje Schermer et al., The Future of Psychopharmacological Enhancements:
Expectations and Policies, 2 NEUROETHICS 75, 78 (2009).
253. Peter Conrad & Deborah Potter, Human Growth Hormone and the Temptations of
Biomedical Enhancement, 26 SOC. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS, 184, 187–88 (2004).
254. Anabolic Steroid (Oral Route, Parenteral Route),
MAYO CLINIC,
www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/anabolic-steroid-oral-route-parenteralroute/description/drg-20069323 (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
255. Steven Reinberg, Prescription Painkillers Trail Only Marijuana in Abuse Rates,
Report Shows, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 10, 2013, http://health.usnews.com/healthnews/news/articles/2013/01/10/prescription-painkillers-trail-only-marijuana-in-abuse-ratesreport-shows.
256. Although the FDA assesses drugs’ safety in relation to their efficacy in treating
specific indications, in many cases a drug may be no less safe, and no less beneficial, when used
for enhancement purposes rather than therapy. For example, a person who is healthy, but very
short gets no less benefit, and incurs no greater safety risk from using HGH to increase his
height than an individual with a malfunctioning pituitary gland who uses the drug for the
same purpose.
257. Pete Stark, U.S. Taxpayers Are Funding Prescription Drug Abuse, USA TODAY:
MAG. AM. SCENE, July 1991, at 88 (“Given an option between a white powder of unknown
origin and quality and a pill with a manufacturer’s logo, made under U.S. government quality
control, the decision for the abuser is easy.”).
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Initial forays into restricting off-label uses of HGH illustrate the
difficulty of trying to limit medical interventions to certain approved
therapeutic uses. In 1990, Congress banned the distribution of
HGH for nontherapeutic uses, such as enhancing athletic
performance or combatting the effects of aging. 258 However, law
enforcement has faced substantial challenges in seeking to prevent
patients from using the drug in unapproved ways. The U.S.
Attorneys Civil Resource Manual notes the difficulty of obtaining
evidence that a physician is prescribing HGH improperly, suggesting
that prosecutors should consider making “‘controlled buys’ using
undercover agents or informants” and issuing search warrants and
grand jury subpoenas for physicians’ medical files. 259
For all the intrusiveness of undercover agents posing as patients
and rifling through doctors’ medical files, the payoff is elusive.
Despite the efforts of prosecutors—not to mention endless sports
scandals and media stories—off-label use of HGH continues to
soar. 260 In 2006, the federal government began a crackdown in an
attempt to reduce “misuse” of the drug. 261 While the effort
succeeded in reducing the flow of illicit supplies from Mexico,
China, and India, domestic consumption of HGH nevertheless
skyrocketed, with sales increasing 69 percent from 2005 to 2011.262
Although endocrinologists estimate that patients who meet the
diagnostic criteria for the approved uses of HGH would use roughly
180,000 prescriptions or refills each year, in 2011 pharmacies filled
nearly twice that many orders. 263 Doctors who are motivated to
prescribe the drug for off-label purposes seem to have little difficulty

258. 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (1994) (“[W]hoever knowingly distributes . . . human
growth hormone for any use in humans other than the treatment of a disease or other
recognized medical condition, where such use has been authorized by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services . . . is guilty of an offense punishable by not more than 5 years
in prison . . . .”).
259. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS CIVIL RESOURCE MANUAL 19
(3d ed. 2012).
260. Crackdown on Human Growth Hormone Instead Leads to Record Sales,
(Dec.
21, 2012),
OREGONLIVE
www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2012/12/crackdown_on_human_growth_horm.html.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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crafting diagnoses in ways that “exploit wiggle room in the law
restricting use of HGH.” 264
In sum, attempts to prevent people from using biological
interventions to modify their bodies and minds have a poor track
record, imposing significant costs while seeming to do little to
prevent these practices. Restricting access to interventions that are
reasonably safe, that have approved uses, and that offer important,
tangible benefits is likely to fail even more profoundly than attempts
to limit access to dangerous, banned substances that offer
mere euphoria. 265
B. The Treatment/Enhancement Distinction Is a Poor Foundation for
Regulatory Policy
Further complicating the enforcement challenges of restricting
uses of medical technology, the fundamental idea on which these
reform proposals rest—a distinction between treatments and
enhancements—is an unworkable basis for regulation. The concept
of disease is too malleable, and diagnoses too subjective, to prevent
people from using medical interventions in the ways that concern
critics. Policies built on this foundation would simply increase the
incentives to recast identity-modifying interventions as treatments
for illnesses.
Proponents of reform do not advocate preventing people from
treating their illnesses and disabilities. Rather, they argue that
regulators should be empowered to identify nontherapeutic uses of
medical technology and subject only these practices to broader
scrutiny and tighter restrictions. Fukuyama proposes that in
distinguishing between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” uses of
medical technology, “[o]ne obvious way to draw red lines is to
distinguish between therapy and enhancement, directing research

264. Id.
265. Prohibition is particularly ineffective at restricting access to drugs, which are
commodities that can be easily distributed and do not require medical expertise to use. This
approach might be more effective in the context of other forms of enhancement, such as
surgeries or genetic interventions that require trained physicians to administer them. That said,
one need not look far to find stories of physicians providing prohibited interventions or falsely
claiming therapeutic purposes for cosmetic procedures, athletic enhancements, and
prescription drug abuse. See id.; infra notes 272 and 294.
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toward the former while putting restrictions on the latter.”266
Similarly, Fox argues, “[T]he FDA should distinguish medical
products with enhancement capacities as a separate category called
‘potential enhancement products.’” 267 While purely therapeutic
interventions would continue to be evaluated based on safety and
efficacy, those with enhancement potential would be “earmarked for
special analysis and consideration” to determine whether other moral
or social concerns argue in favor of restricting enhancement uses. 268
This approach would face profound problems in distinguishing
legitimate “therapies” for illnesses from ostensibly nontherapeutic
“enhancements.” While it is easy to imagine we have a clear
understanding about basic concepts like health, illness, and disability,
on closer inspection we find disagreement and confusion. Most
people probably would agree that Tay Sachs—a fatal condition
afflicting newborn infants—is a terrible illness, and an intervention
that cured it would be a treatment. Conversely, most probably would
agree that giving humans wings, as one surgeon has proposed, would
be a form of enhancement. 269 But between the black and white of
extreme examples lies a much broader grey area where there are no
clear answers.
“Behaviors do not come naturally labeled as ‘disease’ and
‘nondisease;’ humans make those distinctions and . . . we regularly
change them.” 270 Within the philosophical literature a debate has
raged for decades over how to define health and illness and
distinguish treatment from enhancement—or whether such
distinctions can be meaningfully drawn at all. 271

266. FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 208.
267. Fox, supra note 97, at 1194.
268. Id. at 1194–95.
269. Lauren Slater, Dr. Daedalus, HARPER’S MAG., July 2001, at 57.
270. Henry T. Greely, Direct Brain Interventions to “Treat” Disfavored Human
Behaviors: Ethical and Social Issues, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 163, 163
(2012); see also ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN AND THE
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 29 (2012) (“Ability is a tyranny of the majority. If most people could
flap their arms and fly, the inability to do so would be a disability. If most people were
geniuses, those of moderate intelligence would be disastrously disadvantaged. There is no
ontological truth enshrined in what we think of as good health; it is merely a convention, one
that has been strikingly inflated in the past century.”).
271. Christopher Boorse, On the Distinction between Disease and Illness, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 49, 56–64 (1975); Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOL. 113,
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This controversy also routinely plays out in the policy context,
particularly when people seek medical interventions at the public’s
expense. Consider blepharoplasty—a procedure more commonly
known as an “eyelid lift.” Cosmetic surgeons often market these lifts
as a way to produce more youthful looking eyes, but the procedure
can also help patients for whom sagging eyelids hinder their field of
vision. 272 From 2001 to 2011, the number of these procedures
charged to Medicare more than tripled, prompting concern that tax
dollars are being used to pay for many purely cosmetic procedures.273
However, distinguishing between cosmetic eyelid lifts and those that
should be deemed medically necessary is “notoriously difficult” to
do. 274 Even when a patient’s drooping eyelids interfere with her
vision, blepharoplasty will produce a more youthful appearance as a
“side-effect.” 275 Doctors are skilled at documenting the therapeutic
benefits patients receive from these procedures, making claims of
improper Medicare billing difficult and expensive to prove. 276
The State of New Jersey encountered similar problems in seeking
to enforce a tax on cosmetic surgery. That tax applied only to
“medical procedures performed in order to improve the human
subject’s appearance without significantly serving to prevent or treat
illness or disease or to promote proper functioning of the body.” 277
The State repealed the tax just eight years after it was enacted,
reportedly because disputes about whether procedures were cosmetic
or therapeutic made collecting the taxes more expensive than the
revenues generated. 278
114–15 (1960); Peter H. Schwartz, Defending the Distinction Between Treatment and
Enhancement, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 17, 17–18 (2005).
272. Joe Eaton & David Donald, Eyelid Lifts Skyrocket Among Medicare Patients, Costing
Taxpayers Millions, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 28, 2013, 5:00 AM),
www.publicintegrity.org/2013/05/28/12713/eyelid-lifts-skyrocket-among-medicarepatients-costing-taxpayers-millions.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Cosmetic Medical Procedures Gross Receipts Tax, N.J.S.A. 54:32E-1 (2012).
278. Christopher Beam, Breast Practices: Why Taxing Cosmetic Surgery Is a Bad Idea,
SLATE
(Nov.
3,
2009,
8:06
PM),
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2009/11/breast_practices.html (“[T]he
only plan to tax cosmetic surgery so far, in New Jersey, has been a failure, costing $3 in
administrative spending for every dollar of revenue. The main problem, apparently, has been
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The challenge of distinguishing between therapy and
enhancements is exponentially more difficult in the context of
mental illnesses. This task requires deciding which variations of
beliefs, emotions, and behaviors should be considered within the
range of “normal” identities and which should be considered signs
of illness. In the United States, we have largely delegated this task to
the American Psychiatric Association, which publishes a
compendium of mental illnesses called the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (the “DSM”). The volume is important
not only to psychiatrists, but to policymakers, insurers, courts,
schools, and others for whom it is relevant whether individuals
should be considered mentally ill. 279
The DSM’s classifications and diagnostic criteria have been
subjects of endless controversy. For example, the Association’s own
research reveals that doctors faced with identical patients routinely
reach opposite conclusions about the presence or absence of even the
most common mental illnesses. 280 In other words, practicing
psychiatrists often disagree about whether particular patients suffer
from depression (in which case prescribing antidepressants would
constitute treatment), or whether the patients are not ill (so that
prescribing drugs would constitute enhancement).
There are no fMRI scans or blood tests that identify the presence
of mental illness. 281 Even if psychiatrists could identify physiological
factors that reliably correlate with certain behaviors, emotions, or
tendencies, this would not answer which of these variations should

the difficulty in defining ‘elective’ versus ‘reconstructive’ surgery. Who decides whether an
operation to fix your nasal breathing, which also happens to make your nose look straighter, is
functional or aesthetic?”).
279. Cia Bearden, The Reality of the DSM in the Legal Arena: A Proposition for
Curtailing Undesired Consequences of an Imperfect Tool, 13 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79,
82–84 (2012).
280. Allen Frances, DSM-5 Field Trials Discredit the American Psychiatric Association,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-frances/dsm-5-fieldtrials-discre_b_2047621.html.
281. See Thomas Insel, Director’s Blog: Transforming Diagnosis, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL
HEALTH (Apr. 29, 2013), www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/transformingdiagnosis.shtml (“Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the
DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective
laboratory measure.”).
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be categorized as illnesses rather than merely differences. 282 Rather,
determining whether a difference should be considered an illness is
an inherently subjective determination—one that is inextricably tied
to contested conceptions of the good life and influenced by
contemporary social expectations and prejudices. 283
In 1851, a physician named Samuel Cartwright sounded the
alarm over the spread of “drapetomania,” a dire affliction that caused
slaves to flee captivity. 284 Cartwright contended this illness could be
treated with “proper medical advice, strictly followed”—he
prescribed “whipping the devil out of them.” 285 In The Protest
Psychosis, Jonathan Metzl shows how psychiatry reflected the racial
anxieties of the Civil Rights era by transforming schizophrenia from
“an illness that afflicted nonviolent, white, petty criminals” to “a
disorder of racialized aggression” disproportionately applied to black
men. 286 Black men arrested for participating in civil rights protests or
destroying property during civil unrest were committed to insane
asylums, where their medical charts included comments like
“[p]aranoid against his doctors and the police” and “[w]ould be a
danger to society were he not in an institution.” 287 Perhaps most
notoriously, for decades the American Psychiatric Association
identified homosexuality as a pathological “sexual deviation,”
alongside sadism and necrophilia. Following a sustained campaign by

282. As Robert Spitzer, a leading architect of the DSM, wrote about debates regarding
whether homosexuality should be considered a mental illness, “Often in discussions of this
kind a hope is expressed that some biological ‘abnormality,’ such as an endocrine or genetic
disturbance, will be discovered and will resolve the issue once and for all. It is hard to see how
this would answer the question any more than would knowledge of the biological cause or
antecedents of left-handedness (surely there must be one) indicate whether that condition
should be regarded as a normal variant or pathology.” Robert L. Spitzer, The Diagnostic Status
of Homosexuality in DSM-III: A Reformulation of the Issues, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 210,
213 (1981).
283. Id. at 214 (“The concept of ‘disorder’ always involves a value judgment.”).
284. Samuel A. Cartwright, Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race, XI DEBOW’S
REVIEW (1851).
285. Id.
286. Christopher Lane, How Schizophrenia Became a Black Disease: An Interview with
Jonathan Metzl, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 5, 2010), www.psychologytoday.com/blog/sideeffects/201005/how-schizophrenia-became-black-disease-interview-jonathan-metzl.
See
generally JONATHAN M. METZL, THE PROTEST PSYCHOSIS: HOW SCHIZOPHRENIA BECAME A
BLACK DISEASE (2010).
287. Lane, supra note 286.
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gay activists, the APA finally removed homosexuality from the DSM
in 1973, and today, it is increasingly viewed not as a disorder, but as
a valid identity. 288 Following this example, in recent years many other
groups have argued that traits labeled as illnesses and disabilities—
such as deafness, autism, and transsexualism—are simply different
identities that should be respected and accommodated rather
than treated. 289
The blurriness of the distinction between identity and illness
often cuts the other way as well, with traits and behaviors once
viewed as elements of personality or character being reconceptualized as forms of illness—a process referred to as
“medicalization.” 290 While “drunkenness” and “gluttony” were once
viewed as character flaws, today they are often characterized as the
mental illnesses “alcohol use disorder” and “binge eating
disorder.” 291 A person who is tired as a result of working the night
shift can be diagnosed with “shift work sleep disorder” and treated
with stimulants. 292 Virtually any life challenge or shortcoming (e.g.,
picky eating, temper tantrums, or excessive shopping) can be
characterized as an illness (like “selective eating disorder,”

288. Kenneth J. Zucker & Robert L. Spitzer, Was the Gender Identity Disorder of
Childhood Diagnosis Introduced into DSM-III as a Backdoor Maneuver to Replace
Homosexuality? A Historical Note, 31 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 31, 31 (2005);
Homosexuality Not an Illness, Chinese Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2001,
www.nytimes.com/2001/03/08/health/08PSYC.html (stating Japan and China removed
homosexuality as mental illness in 1995 and 2001, respectively).
289. SOLOMON, supra note 270, at 18 (“The reasonable corollary to the queer
experience is that everyone has a defect, that everyone has an identity, and that they are often
one and the same.”); Andrew Solomon, The Autism Rights Movement, N.Y. MAG. (May 25,
2008), http://nymag.com/news/features/47225/; Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Aug. 28, 1994), www.nytimes.com/1994/08/28/magazine/defiantlydeaf.html?pagewanted=all.
290. Peter Conrad & Valerie Leiter, Medicalization, Markets and Consumers, 45 J.
HEALTH SOC. BEHAV. 158, 158 (2004).
291. Alcohol Use Disorders, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM,
www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/alcohol-use-disorders (last
visited Mar. 4, 2015); Feeding and Eating Disorders, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
www.dsm5.org/Documents/Eating%20Disorders%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar.
4, 2015).
CLINIC,
292. Shift
Work
Sleep
Disorder,
CLEVELAND
http://my.clevelandclinic.org/neurological_institute/sleep-disorders-center/disordersconditions/hic-shift-work-sleep-disorder.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
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“intermittent
explosive
disorder,”
and
“compulsive
293
buying disorder”).
Singling out enhancement practices for special restrictions, as
reformers propose, would increase the incentives—among drug
companies, patients, and physicians—to characterize social problems
as medical conditions needing treatment. Patients who want
particular interventions—and the companies that want to sell them—
would share a common interest in ensuring that those interventions
were thought of as treating recognized illnesses, rather than labeled
as “enhancements.” For their part, doctors have already
demonstrated their willingness to stretch diagnostic criteria to justify
prescribing interventions to suffering patients. 294 By broadening the
conditions that are considered to be illnesses, these stakeholders
could work an end-run around regulations that aim to restrict
nontherapeutic practices. 295
Changing whether a behavior or emotional response is normal or
disordered can be as simple as tweaking the diagnostic criteria in the

293. Patti Neighmond, Road Rage: A Symptom of Much More than Bad Traffic?, NPR
(Dec. 12, 2011), www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/12/12/143457950/road-rage-aMED.,
symptom-of-much-more-than-bad-traffic;
Eating
Disorders,
DUKE
www.dukemedicine.org/treatments/psychiatry/eating-disorders (last visited Nov. 8, 2015)
(“Picky or selective eating services: We are at the forefront of care for this newly recognized
eating problem, where children and adults severely restrict the types of food they eat, or reject
foods on the basis of taste, texture or sensory quality.”); Donald W. Black, A Review of
Compulsive Buying Disorder, 6 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 14, 14 (2007).
294. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 59 (describing psychiatrist Peter Kramer’s experiences
prescribing Prozac to help patients whom he believed did not meet diagnostic criteria for
mental illnesses); Leona Cuttler et al., Short Stature and Growth Hormone Therapy: A National
Study of Physician Recommendation Patterns, 276 JAMA 531, 533 (1996) (ninety-four percent
of surveyed endocrinologists reported having recommended HGH to increase the height of
children who were not suffering from growth hormone deficiencies); BEYOND THERAPY, supra
note 88, at 306 (“With the decline in the cultural authority of religious institutions, and with
the shrinking of other communal systems of help and support for people in difficulty,
physicians often find themselves simply ‘neighbor to the problem.’ Rightly extending a helping
hand, they often conceive and treat the problems they encounter in a purely
medical fashion.”).
295. Drug companies, doctors, and patients already have substantial incentives to
medicalize unpleasant conditions because insurers will only pay for interventions that are
deemed medically necessary. However, as the enormous cosmetic surgery market amply
demonstrates, nontherapeutic interventions can be very profitable even when patients must pay
out of their own pockets. Banning certain off-label interventions altogether would pose a
much bigger threat to the profits of drug and device companies, heightening the importance
to this industry of ensuring that these interventions are considered therapeutic.
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DSM. For example, when the APA first recognized “social anxiety
disorder” (SAD) in 1980, it was an obscure diagnosis with an
estimated prevalence of roughly 2.75 percent. 296 Following a
loosening of the criteria used to diagnose SAD—and an aggressive
marketing campaign by the maker of Paxil, an antidepressant
approved to treat the condition—by the 1990s that figure had
quadrupled, with studies estimating one out of every eight
Americans suffered from the illness. 297 Attention disorders reflect a
similar trajectory. Again, following a loosening of diagnostic criteria
and a multi-pronged public relations effort by drug makers, 298 the
number of children diagnosed with ADHD rose by more than 40
percent in the past decade. 299 Today, 11 percent of all school-age
children—and roughly 20 percent of high school-age boys—are
diagnosed with this condition. 300 It is unlikely that substantially more
people are extremely fearful of social situations today than they were
in 1980, or that 40 percent more children have difficulty
concentrating than they did a decade ago. Rather, levels of shyness
and distractedness that we used to think of as normal, if sometimes
disadvantageous, are now characterized as forms of mental illness
that are legitimate targets for drug therapy.
Perhaps no shift better illustrates the slipperiness of the concept
of mental illness than recent changes to the DSM’s definition of
“major depressive disorder,” which includes criteria such as
“depressed mood” and “loss of interest or pleasure” for a period of
at least two weeks. 301 Until recently, the DSM included a
“bereavement exclusion” under which a person who had experienced
the death of a loved one was not considered depressed unless these

296. Allan V. Horwitz, Creating Mental Illness in Non-Disordered Community
Populations, in ESTABLISHING MEDICAL REALITY: ESSAYS IN THE METAPHYSICS AND
EPISTEMOLOGY OF BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE 130 (Harold Kincaid & Jennifer McKitrick,
eds. 2007).
297. Id.; Conrad & Leiter, supra note 290, 163–64.
298. Alan Schwartz, The Selling of Attention Deficit Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, December 14,
2013, at A1.
299. Alan Schwarz & Sarah Cohen, A.D.H.D. Seen in 11% of U.S. Children as Diagnoses
Rise, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2013, at A1.
300. Id.
301. Major Depressive Disorder, in DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (American Psychiatric Association, ed., 5th ed., 2013) (ebook),
http://dsm.psychiatryonline.org/content.aspx?bookid=556&sectionid=41101760#1034374 \9.
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symptoms lasted more than two months—in recognition of the fact
that grief is a normal, not disordered, response to a loved one’s
death. 302 However, the latest version of the DSM excised that
exclusion. 303 The result is that a person may be diagnosed as mentally
ill if she experiences persistent feelings of sadness or emptiness for
more than two weeks after the death of her spouse or child. 304
If prescribing drugs to relieve this kind of grief qualifies as
“treatment,” it is hard to see how regulators could draw any
defensible lines that would differentiate treatment of mental illnesses
from elective modification of emotions.
Reform proponents might argue that an agency with broad
powers to regulate the uses of medical technology could serve as a
bulwark against increasing medicalization, drawing lines that separate
treatment from enhancement. 305 But because there is no objective
way to determine which types of distress should be characterized as
illnesses, such an agency would be forced to draw distinctions that
are inherently arbitrary and are wed to contemporary prejudices and
contested notions of the good life. Such a body would be charged
with determining which kinds of psychic distress are forms of illness
and which are valid identities, personalities, or quirks. It would be
responsible for determining what levels of anxiety, social discomfort,
trouble concentrating, cognitive performance, or grief are sufficient
to merit treatment, and what levels people should simply have to live
with. Had this kind of authority existed in the 1970s, when
homosexuality was categorized as a mental illness and gender

302. Paula Span, Grief Over New Depression Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013,
http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/grief-over-new-depression-diagnosis/.
303. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER AND THE
“BEREAVEMENT
EXCLUSION”
(2013),
www.dsm5.org/Documents/Bereavement%20Exclusion%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
304. Megan Brooks, The Case for Retaining Bereavement Exclusion in DSM-5,
MEDSCAPE (Feb. 6, 2012), www.medscape.com/viewarticle/758097.
305. For example, Fukuyama argues that “even in the cases where the borderline
between sickness and health, therapy and enhancement, is murkier, regulatory agencies are
routinely able to make these distinctions in practice.” FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 209–10.
However, Fukuyama bases his argument on the incorrect claim that CSA-scheduled drugs like
Ritalin can only be taken therapeutically. Id. at 210. In fact, the CSA does not bar physicians
from prescribing drugs off-label for nontherapeutic purposes. Indeed, Fukuyama himself
believes Ritalin “is overprescribed in the United States and used in situations in which parents
and teachers ought to employ more traditional means of engaging children and shaping their
characters.” Id. at 210.
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identity disorder was not, regulators might have endorsed “treating”
the illness of homosexuality while disallowing sex reassignment
surgery on the grounds that it constituted improper “enhancement.”
The intrusiveness of this kind of regulatory authority becomes
apparent when one considers the myriad other ways people can
change their brains and bodies. 306 Consider a drug that produced the
same behavioral and personality changes as meditation practice. If
such a drug raised concerns about undermining human agency or
authenticity, those concerns would seem to apply equally to
meditation. If it is appropriate for government to restrict access to
the drug on these bases, it is not clear why that power should be
limited to biomedical interventions. Yet presumably most people
would recoil at the thought of empowering a regulator to try to
prevent people from meditating—or exercising, changing their diets,
or employing any of the other methods people use to change their
physical and emotional states.
In the context of biological interventions, we empower
government to operate paternalistically because these interventions
pose potential health risks that most laypeople are not wellpositioned to evaluate. Clinical trials provide regulators objective
ways to assess and measure the physical risks posed by drugs. This
limited basis for accepting paternalism in the context of biological
interventions provides a limiting principle for government
interference. But if it is appropriate to expand medical regulation
beyond these parameters to “adjudicate among competing ethical
claims,” 307 it is not clear why that power should be limited to
biomedical interventions. Regulators would have no objective basis
for making these determinations, nor would they be better
positioned to make these assessments than the individuals who wish
to use these technologies. 308
306. See, e.g., Greely et al., supra note 37, at 703 (“Drugs may seem distinctive among
enhancements in that they bring about their effects by altering brain function, but in reality so
does any intervention that enhances cognition. Recent research has identified beneficial neural
changes engendered by exercise, nutrition and sleep, as well as instruction and reading. In
short, cognitive-enhancing drugs seem morally equivalent to other, more
familiar, enhancements.”).
307. FUKUYAMA & FURGER, supra note 2, at 17.
308. These distinctions may continue to be necessary in the context of paying for
medical interventions. Public and private health insurance systems can define for themselves
the boundaries of their coverage, and insurers and patients can battle over whether particular
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In some cases, restricting medical practices that have profound
implications for one’s identity is tantamount to restricting who
people are allowed to become—how they look, think, and behave.
Proposals to empower a regulatory agency to make decisions of that
sort, particularly to enforce conceptions of morality that many
people do not share, should give pause.
C. Government Should Not Interfere with Deeply Personal Medical
Decisions to Enforce Contested Moral Views
Although arbitrary and contentious distinctions are unavoidable
features of many regulatory systems, these attributes are troubling in
the context of interfering with deeply personal decisions involving
modifying one’s own body or mind. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized—specifically in cases regarding access to
medical interventions—that government should not intrude on these
types of decisions to enforce contested views of morality. These cases
affirm that while limited restrictions may be justified to protect
patient health, such interference is improper when undertaken to
enforce prevailing morality. While assessing the constitutionality of
restricting access to identity-modifying interventions is beyond the
scope of this article, the Court’s reasoning in these cases argues for
caution in expanding government power to regulate medical
interventions on moral grounds.
1. Many decisions regarding medical interventions are protected from
undue state interference
Fukuyama contends that the propriety of regulating medical
interventions
to
enforce
prevailing
morality
should
be uncontroversial:

interventions fall within their policies’ contractual terms. But declining to pay for certain
interventions—particularly by private insurers—is far less intrusive than barring people from
obtaining interventions for themselves. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)
(finding that a woman’s constitutional right to be free from undue state interference in
obtaining nontherapeutic abortions does not also entail “a constitutional entitlement to the
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.”). But see STEPHEN
HOLMES & CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES
(1999) (arguing that the distinction between positive and negative rights is illusory).
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The answer to the question of who gets to decide on the legitimate
and illegitimate uses of science is actually pretty simple, and has
been established by several centuries of political theory and
practice: it is the democratically constituted political community,
acting chiefly through their elected representatives, that is
sovereign in these matters and has authority to control the pace
and scope of technological development. 309

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized
the legitimacy of regulating medical interventions. In 1921, the
Court explained that “[t]here can be no question of the authority of
the State in the exercise of its police power to regulate the
administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous and habitforming drugs”—a power the Court characterized as “so manifest in
the interest of the public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary to
enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too firmly
established to be successfully called in question.” 310
Yet the State’s power to regulate medical interventions is not
unlimited. Where medical interventions affect bodily integrity or
identity in fundamental ways, the Court has repeatedly recognized
that individuals’ decisions about these interventions can implicate a
“realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.” 311
Many of these cases involve individuals’ rights to refuse medical
interventions. In Winston v. Lee, the Court rejected state prosecutors’
request to have a bullet surgically removed from a criminal
defendant’s chest, citing “the extent of intrusion upon the
individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily
integrity.” 312 Other cases recognize that control over one’s body can
intertwine with interests involving defining one’s identity. The Court
has repeatedly determined that administering drugs to change
prisoners’ and criminal defendants’ thinking and behavior implicates
309. FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 186.
310. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
311. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992); see also id. at 927
(Blackmun, J. concurring) (“These cases embody the principle that personal decisions that
profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach
of government.”).
312. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952) (subjecting a criminal suspect to “stomach pumping” against his will in order
to determine whether he had swallowed drugs “shock[ed] the conscience” and violated the
suspect’s due process rights).
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constitutionally protected liberties. 313 In Washington v. Harper, the
Court affirmed that even prisoners—whose rights are severely
circumscribed—“possess[] a significant liberty interest in avoiding
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,” emphasizing
that the purpose of administering these drugs was “to alter the
chemical balance in a patient’s brain” in order to produce
“changes . . . in his or her cognitive processes.”314
While the aforementioned cases recognize a liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical interventions, the Court has also
repeatedly recognized a protected interest in accessing desired
interventions—including for nontherapeutic purposes—free from
unwarranted government interference. 315 Although to date these
cases have involved reproduction technologies, they are instructive
here because they involve government efforts to restrict
nontherapeutic medical practices on the basis of moral concerns
other than safety.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck down a Massachusetts’
statute that prohibited unmarried persons from using contraceptives
to prevent pregnancy. 316 In the present context, the Eisenstadt
decision has three notable features. First, the challenged law
distinguished between therapeutic and nontherapeutic uses of
contraception and singled out the latter for restrictions. The statute
permitted all individuals to use contraceptives to protect their health.
313. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (finding that “[t]he forcible
injection of medication into a nonconsenting person’s body . . . represents a substantial
interference with that person’s liberty” and that “[i]n the case of antipsychotic drugs . . . that
inference is particularly severe,” in part because of how the drugs affect the individual’s
cognitive processes) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)); Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (finding that subjecting prisoners to involuntary psychiatric
treatment, including “mandatory behavior modification,” constitutes “the kind of deprivations
of liberty that requires procedural protections”); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003)
(“[F]orced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render [a criminal defendant] competent
to stand trial unconstitutionally deprive[d] him of his ‘liberty’ to reject medical treatment.”).
314. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 229 (1990); see also id. at 237–38
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the purpose or effect of forced drugging is to alter the will
and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and
fundamental sense.”).
315. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 927 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Just as the
Due Process Clause protects the deeply personal decision of the individual to refuse medical
treatment, it also must protect the deeply personal decision to obtain
medical treatment . . . .”).
316. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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The sole effect of the challenged law was to bar single individuals
from using contraceptives for a nontherapeutic purpose: preventing
pregnancy. 317 Second, the Court determined that using
contraceptives
to
prevent
pregnancy
implicates
matters
“fundamentally affecting a person,” even when such interventions
are not used for therapeutic purposes. 318 Finally, the Court rejected
the contention that the law’s purpose was to promote safety, noting
that the statute “was cast only in terms of morals.” 319 The Court’s
emphasis of this point suggests it might have been receptive to the
statute had its purpose been to promote safety rather than to enforce
a particular morality.
The Court’s key abortion cases reflect the same features: because
the decision of whether to bear a child implicates women’s bodily
integrity and identity in fundamental ways, the Constitution limits
the State’s authority to restrict access to abortion on the basis of
contested moral doctrines—even with respect to abortions that are
not undertaken to protect a woman’s health. In Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, the Court emphasized that abortion implicates “the urgent
claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny
and her body,” which the Court identified as “central to personal
dignity and autonomy” and “implicit in the meaning of liberty.” 320 In
an often-quoted passage, the Court explained that “[a]t the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.” 321
As in Eisenstadt, the Casey Court determined that respecting
these personal choices requires protecting access not only to

317. Id. at 442 (“The statutory scheme distinguishes among three distinct classes of
distributees—first, married persons may obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but only
from doctors or druggists on prescription; second, single persons may not obtain contraceptives
from anyone to prevent pregnancy; and, third, married or single persons may obtain
contraceptives from anyone to prevent, not pregnancy, but the spread of disease.”).
318. Id. at 453.
319. Id. at 450.
320. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 869, 923; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (observing that pregnancy and motherhood not only present health risks to the
woman’s body, but that “[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future”).
321. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
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abortions undertaken for medical reasons, but to nontherapeutic
procedures as well. The Court held that prior to fetal viability the
State may not unduly interfere with a woman’s decision to terminate
a pregnancy, even when an abortion is not therapeutic—i.e., not
necessary to protect the woman’s health. The Court expressly
rejected the contention that States could prohibit all abortions
undertaken for nontherapeutic reasons and permit them only “in
those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to
[a woman’s] own life or health . . . .” 322
Also as in Eisenstadt, the Casey Court distinguished between
States’ legitimate interests in protecting maternal health and
improper attempts to regulate deeply personal decisions regarding
reproduction to enforce particular conceptions of morality. The
Court acknowledged the power of the State to “enact regulations to
further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion,” and
affirmed the validity of several regulations that it concluded
furthered that goal. 323 But while the Court recognized the State’s
interest in protecting potential human life as a valid basis for
restricting some abortions, it deemed even that compelling interest
insufficient to overcome a woman’s right to an abortion before fetal
viability. The Court expressly rejected the contention that the State
could interfere with these decisions based solely on contested
moral grounds:
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose
some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual
implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.
Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the
State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive
way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter. 324

322.
323.
324.
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The Court rejected that power, instead determining that “[t]he
destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.” 325
2. Enhancement technologies can likewise implicate individual liberty
in fundamental ways
Mindful of the seemingly broad implications of its conclusion
that due process enshrines a right to “define one’s own concept of
existence,” the Casey Court took pains to limit the applicability of its
decision in other contexts, opining that with respect to pregnancy
“the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human
condition and so unique to the law.” 326 Yet other medical
interventions could implicate bodily integrity and identity in similarly
fundamental ways. Indeed, some of the most potent concerns
regarding enhancements are driven precisely by the power of these
interventions to profoundly shape individuals’ identities by
modifying their bodies and brains.
Consider the increasingly plausible prospect of memory-editing
interventions. If a pharmaceutical company developed a drug that
erased specific memories, it might seek FDA approval for the drug as
a therapy for PTSD, emphasizing its potential to help people erase
memories of traumatic events. 327 While many people might find this
approach to treating PTSD troubling, 328 that concern would pale
compared to the outcry when doctors began prescribing these
interventions “off label” to help people erase painful memories that
fall short of disabling, such as experiences of loss, embarrassment,
or shame. 329
This is precisely the kind of intervention that a regulatory body
charged with “discriminat[ing] between those technological

325. Id. at 852.
326. Id. at 851.
327. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 207 (“To be sure, these agents—and their
better versions, yet to come—are, for now at least, being developed not as means for druginduced happiness but rather as agents for combating major depression or preventing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Yet once available for those purposes, they could also be
used to ease the soul and enhance the mood of nearly anyone.”).
328. For a discussion of concerns raised by memory modification, see supra
Section I.B.7.
329. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 207.
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advances that promote human flourishing, and those that pose a
threat to human dignity and well-being” might choose to restrict.330
Yet the very concerns that might motivate such restrictions
demonstrate how profoundly this would interfere with individuals’
abilities to forge their own identities and define their own
personhood. Indeed, the President’s Council on Bioethics grounded
its concerns about memory erasure on the premise that memory is
“central to human flourishing” and is a fundamental element of the
“pursuit of happiness.” 331 The Council worried that “an unchecked
power to erase memories . . . could imperil our capacity to form a
strong and coherent personal identity,” 332 arguing that our memory
allows us to know who we are and “preserves for us the complex
web of lived experiences that furnish our sense of self.” 333 Dr. Eric R.
Kandel, a Nobel Prize-winning neuroscientist and leading memory
researcher, has also expressed concern about memory-editing
technologies, arguing that “we are who we are. We’re all part of
what we’ve experienced.” 334
According to these critics’ own assessments, then, erasing
memories is troubling because it profoundly implicates how an
individual “define[s] one’s own concept of existence.” 335 In other
words, the very concerns that might animate restrictions on memory
erasure make a compelling argument that the use of such
interventions falls squarely within the “realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter.” 336 Indeed, if anything the
state’s interests appear more compelling in the context of abortion,
where a potential human life is at stake, than with respect to memory

330. FUKUYAMA, supra note 3, at 182.
331. BEYOND THERAPY, supra note 88, at 215.
332. Id. at 212.
333. Id. at 214.
334. Claudia Dreifus, A Quest to Understand How Memory Works, N.Y. TIMES, March 5,
2012, at D2; see also Lehrer, supra note 82 (“Being able to control memory doesn’t simply
give us admin access to our brains. It gives us the power to shape nearly every aspect of our
lives. There’s something terrifying about this.”).
335. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
336. Id. at 847. Indeed, among the fundamental rights the Supreme Court has
determined are implicit in the concept of liberty are “freedom of thought [and] belief.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the
power to control men’s minds.”).
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erasure, where the state’s interests are more nebulous
and speculative.
Of course, given the broad range of interventions that have some
effect on identity, many medical practices may not implicate personal
liberty in such profound ways. Placing restrictions on seemingly
trivial interventions like facelifts and “tummy tucks,” for example,
would seem to be relatively minor intrusions. But neither do these
practices seem sufficiently troubling to motivate imposing such
restrictions. Thus, proponents of regulating medical interventions on
moral grounds appear to face a Catch-22. The technologies that can
most powerfully modify identities prompt the greatest moral
concern, and thus the greatest impetus to restrict access to them.
Yet, the greater the power of these interventions to shape identity,
the more likely they are to implicate the kinds of decisions that
should not be interfered with based on contested notions
of morality.
CONCLUSION
There are compelling reasons to regulate medical interventions
to protect health. Virtually everyone agrees that protecting human
health is important. Medical interventions can pose substantial risks
that laypeople are often ill-equipped to assess. Although FDA
decisions regarding drug approvals can be controversial—e.g.,
because people disagree about the level of risk that is acceptable in
relation to possible health benefits 337—there is broad support for
regulating drugs to protect health, and there are objective ways to
measure drugs’ risks and benefits. 338 Under these circumstances, it
makes sense to have a body of experts assessing health risks and
therapeutic benefits.

337. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that
terminally ill patients are entitled to access to unapproved, experimental medications).
338. See, e.g., Consumers Union, Poll: Consumers Want Host of Drug Safety Reforms
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://consumersunion.org/news/poll-consumers-want-host-of-drugsafety-reforms/ (reporting poll results finding that 96 percent of respondents supported
government authority to require warning labels on potentially dangerous prescription drugs,
and 93 percent supported giving the FDA the power to order follow-up safety studies on
drugs that are already on the market).
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The same cannot be said of determining how people should be
permitted to use reasonably safe medical technologies to shape
themselves. Unlike scientists assessing the health risks of drugs, there
are no similarly authoritative experts regarding perceived moral
dangers like agency and authenticity. While government can regulate
on the basis of contested morality in many contexts, its power to
interfere with deeply personal decisions affecting control over one’s
body and mind should be limited. The power of individuals to make
these decisions for themselves should be guarded jealously.
On a pragmatic level, attempts to restrict access to medical
interventions on moral grounds have fared poorly. Despite massive
government expenditures, intrusive enforcement efforts, and often
devastating consequences for individuals caught using banned
interventions, these practices continue unabated. The challenges of
enforcing these kinds of restrictions would be greatly magnified in
the context of FDA-approved interventions, which meet a baseline
of safety and may offer significant benefits to users. Moreover,
imposing special restrictions only on interventions deemed
nontherapeutic would increase incentives for drug companies,
doctors, and patients to recast normal, unwanted conditions as
diseases needing treatment.
Rather than expanding government’s authority to interfere with
medical decisions on moral grounds, we would be better served by
scrubbing the existing systems of medical regulation of these kinds of
judgments and recommitting ourselves to regulating medical
interventions to protect health. Many existing restrictions that are
ostensibly based on safety assessments are in fact motivated by
voters’ moral condemnation of certain practices, leaving access to
medical interventions prey to shifting political winds and the whims
of changing administrations.
Limiting medical regulation to protecting human health does
not suggest that the other concerns raised about enhancement
practices are meritless or unworthy of respect, or that individuals or
their elected representatives are powerless to respond to them.
Banning technologies is not the only way to address the harms these
practices may create, or even the most effective way. Legislators
could address concerns about coercion by prohibiting employers and
schools from requiring employees and students to use these
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interventions. 339 Professional organizations, such as the American
Medical Association, could promulgate guidelines to their members
regarding the ethics of assisting with identity-modifying practices,
including “how to strike the balance of limits for patient benefit and
protection in a liberal democracy.” 340
If all else fails, there is always moral suasion. Those who are
convinced these technologies are detrimental to human flourishing
can argue their case rather than forcing their views on others
through the law. 341 Some people may be persuaded that the benefits
they had hoped to obtain through medical interventions are
outweighed by the risks—whether physical or spiritual—that these
practices pose to themselves or the harms they may impose on
society. Conversely, through dialogue some critics may themselves
come to see certain practices in a new light. When dealing with
decisions affecting control over one’s body and mind, the default
position should be one of respect and tolerance, with a high burden
of persuasion on those who would advocate coercive responses.

339. Greely, supra note 37, at 704.
340. Id.
341. Randy E. Barnett, The Harmful Side Effects of Drug Prohibition, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 11, 13 (2009) (“[E]ven people who agree about the facts fail to grasp that it is the nature
of the means—coercion—chosen to pursue the suppression of voluntary consumptive activity
that makes these [negative effects of prohibition] unavoidable.”).
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